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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

ENERGY HARVESTING AND SENSOR BASED HARDWARE SECURITY
PRIMITIVES FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

The last few decades have seen a large proliferation in the prevalence of cyber-physical
systems. Although cyber-physical systems can offer numerous advantages to society, their
large scale adoption does not come without risks. Internet of Things (IoT) devices can
be considered a significant component within cyber-physical systems. They can provide
network communication in addition to controlling the various sensors and actuators that
exist within the larger cyber-physical system. The adoption of IoT features can also provide attackers with new potential avenues to access and exploit a system’s vulnerabilities.
Previously, existing systems could more or less be considered a closed system with few
potential points of access for attackers. Security was thus not typically a core consideration
when these systems were originally designed. The cumulative effect is that these systems
are now vulnerable to new security risks without having native security countermeasures
that can easily address these vulnerabilities. Even just adding standard security features to
these systems is itself not a simple task. The devices that make up these systems tend to
have strict resource constraints in the form of power consumption and processing power. In
this dissertation, we explore how security devices known as Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) could be used to address these concerns.
PUFs are a class of circuits that are unique and unclonable due to inherent variations
caused by the device manufacturing process. We can take advantage of these PUF properties by using the outputs of PUFs to generate secret keys or pseudonyms that are similarly
unique and unclonable. Existing PUF designs are commonly based around transistor level
variations in a special purpose integrated circuit (IC). Integrating these designs within a
system would still require additional hardware along with system modification to interact
with the device. We address these concerns by proposing a novel PUF design methodology
for the creation of PUFs whose integration within these systems would minimize the cost
of redesigning the system by reducing the need to add additional hardware. This goal is
achieved by creating PUF designs from components that may already exist within these
systems.

A PUF designed from existing components creates the possibility of adding a PUF (and
thus security features) to the system without actually adding any additional hardware. This
could allow PUFs to become a more attractive security option for integration with resource
constrained devices. Our proposed approach specifically targets sensors and energy harvesting devices since they can provide core functions within cyber-physical systems such
as power generation and sensing capabilities. These components are known to exhibit variations due to the manufacturing process and could thus be utilized to design a PUF. Our
first contribution is the proposal of a novel PUF design methodology based on using components which are already commonly found within cyber-physical systems. The proposed
methodology uses eight sensors or energy harvesting devices along with a microcontroller.
It is unlikely that single type of sensor or energy harvester will exist in all possible
cyber-physical systems. Therefore, it is important to create a range of designs in order to
reach a greater portion of cyber-physical systems. The second contribution of this work
is the design of a PUF based on piezo sensors. Our third contribution is the design of a
PUF that utilizes thermistor temperature sensors. The fourth contribution of this work is
a proposed solar cell based PUF design. Furthermore, as a fifth contribution of this dissertation we evaluate a selection of common solar cell materials to establish which type of
solar cell would be best suited to the creation of a PUF based on the operating conditions.
The viability of the proposed designs is evaluated through testing in terms of reliability and
uniformity. In addition, Monte Carlo simulations are performed to evaluate the uniqueness
property of the designs.
For our final contribution we illustrate the security benefits that can be achieved through
the adoption of PUFs by cyber-physical systems. For this purpose we chose to highlight
vehicles since they are a very popular example of a cyber-physical system and they face
unique security challenges which are not readily solvable by standard solutions. Our contribution is the proposal of a novel controller area network (CAN) security framework that
is based on PUFs. The framework does not require any changes to the underlying CAN
protocol and also minimizes the amount of additional message passing overhead needed
for its operation. The proposed framework is a good example of how the cost associated
with implementing such a framework could be further reduced through the adoption of our
proposed PUF designs. The end result is a method which could introduce security to an
inherently insecure system while also making its integration as seamless as possible by attempting to minimize the need for additional hardware.
KEYWORDS: Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), Internet of Things (IoT), Cybersecurity, Hardware Security, Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), Vehicles
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Cyber-Physical Systems

Researchers have made the argument that cyber-physical systems (CPS) and Internet of
Things (IoT) have enough commonalities to be considered anywhere from partially overlapping fields [107] to effectively equivalent [55]. Other researchers have argued that IoT
should be considered a subset of CPS [188] whereas others have argued it is the opposite
such that CPS is actually a subset of IoT [134]. The lack of a clear separation points directly to just how interconnected the two terms actually are. This is further supported by
the fact that a special publication from the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) concluded that the definitions of cyber-physical systems and IoT are actually converging over time. Recognizing this unified perspective provides the opporunity for the
various research communities to “work together to develop unified, new, hybrid, discrete
and continuous methods for CPS and IoT design, operation, and assurance” [49].
For the purposes of this dissertation we consider IoT to be a subset of CPS as defined in
[188]. That work defines CPS as the “merging and integration of Industry Control Systems,
Critical Systems, Critical Infrastructures, Internet of Things (IoT) and Embedded Systems”
[188]. Cyber-physical systems typically use a combination of sensors, actuators, processing
units, and communication via a network. Some very common examples include vehicles
and the aforementioned IoT devices. IoT devices are particularly noteworthy as they can
exist as either a cyber-physical system, or as a component of a cyber-physical system.
They can be considered a major component within certain cyber-physical systems as they
can provide the network communication capabilities in addition to directly interfacing with
the sensors and actuators. Due to being a key component, any IoT specific security issues
should prove just as concerning for the cyber-physical system as a whole [57]. Figure 1.1
provides an example of the pivotal role that IoT devices can play within a larger cyberphysical system.
Cyber-physical systems cover an incredibly diverse range of devices in across a wide
range of fields including medical devices, smart homes and cities, environmental monitoring, and industrial processes [27]. Attempting to provide security for these systems is
a never ending process as new vulnerabilities are discovered and in return new solutions
must be developed. The range of uses for cyber-physical systems can nearly eliminate the
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Figure 1.1: Example of CPS - IoT Integration

potential for one size fits all solutions. We believe one approach that can help address this
issue is by focusing on providing security for very popular examples of cyber-physical systems such as vehicles and IoT devices. IoT devices are particularly noteworthy as they can
be further used as components within other systems. While securing a main component
within cyber-physical systems will not necessarily make the larger system completely secure, it will at least serve as a step in the right direction. It is for this reason that we take
a particular interest in the security of IoT devices. In addition, IoT seemed to be the ideal
component to highlight as it would appear to have the most widespread impact. This is
due not only its already widespread adoption, but also its projected growth over the coming
years.

1.2

Proliferation of IoT and Associated Security Concerns

Some researchers believe that the Internet of Things (IoT) will be the main component of
the next era in computing [54]. IoT is a network of smart devices that are connected via
the internet. A smart device can be described as an internet-enabled embedded system.
The Internet of Things is not limited to only simple devices such as sensors and actuators.
Instead, IoT includes a wide selection of systems with varying complexities such as home
appliances, mobile devices, vehicles, etc. Through IoT, a myriad of connected devices are
able to exchange information as components of intelligent applications.
Consider the communication capabilities of vehicles as a notable example. Vehicles
have adopted increasingly complex features such as collision avoidance, infotainment options, traction control, remote start, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication, autonomous
driving, etc. Vehicles contain numerous electronic control units (ECUs) to control these
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various subsystems. All of the ECUs are connected by internal communication buses in order to exchange critical information between the subsystems. Additionally, some of these
features require communication with external sources. A consequence of these features is
the introduction of multiple potential access points that could be exploited by an attacker.
Unfortunately, the rise of IoT has also coincided with a rise in cybercrime as information transmitted between IoT enabled devices can be the target of cyberattacks. Previous
reports from McAfee and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have
shown a rising trend in the total global loss due to cyber crime [113] [114]. Attackers have
shown that they are more than willing to make IoT devices the focus of their attacks. In the
last few years for example, compromised IoT devices have been used to create botnets.
Botnets are a network of compromised machines that can be used by an attacker for a variety of malicious purposes including distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, password
cracking, and cryptocurrency mining. Once a machine is infected, it seeks to propagate the
infection to other machines in its network by exploiting known vulnerabilities [19].
IoT devices would appear to present an ideal target due to a combination of their lack
of security features and the sheer number of these devices that are currently in existence.
The Mirai botnet in late 2016 was the first major botnet to be primarily composed of embedded and IoT devices. At its peak the botnet had infected 600 thousand devices [8]. One
DDoS attack launched by the botnet was able to disrupt service to many prominent websites including Twitter, New York Times, Reddit, and Airbnb by targeting Domain Name
Service (DNS) company Dyn [44]. A separate DDoS attack against French webhosting
company OVH set the record for largest recorded DDoS attack with a size of at least 1.1
terabits per second (tbps) [168].

1.2.1

Common Security Threats and Challenges

The threats faced by IoT devices are just one, albeit very notable, example of the security
threats that are facing cyber-physical systems as a whole. Other cyber-physical systems
such as industrial control systems (ICS), smart grid, medical devices, and smart cars have
been shown to be similarly vulnerable to attackers [63]. At a glance, there could appear to
exist little commonality between these various types of cyber-physical systems. When it
comes to security however, the devices in various fields are actually subject to a number of
similar threats and constraints. Some examples of this include denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks against ICS [142] and smart cars [20] and exploiting the lack of encryption in
medical devices [81] and smart grids [16].
A recurring source of concern stems from the integration of IoT features. IoT devices
are known to contain more security risks than conventional computing devices [19]. IoT
devices can contain a multitude of vulnerabilities including insecure access interfaces, deployment locations that allow for easy unprotected physical access, and insufficient cryptographic mechanisms (including none at all in some cases) [18, 19, 79]. This is especially
concerning when coupled with that fact that there are currently (as of 2018) 7 billion actively connected IoT devices (39.3% of all connected devices worldwide). These numbers
are projected to grow to the point that in 2025 there will be 21.5 billion actively connected
IoT devices worldwide. IoT devices would then represent 62.5% of all actively connected
devices [106].
3

As originally designed, the dominant methods of security in these systems were related to “security by obscurity”. Devices were assumed to operate in isolation, and it was
therefore difficult for an attacker to access them. However, the push towards a connected
world has resulted in many of these previously isolated devices now including support for
external communication over a variety of networks. The increase in connectivity has also
introduced several previously unconsidered possible attack vectors.

1.2.2

Possible Security Solutions

On the surface, just simply introducing more security features to these devices seems to
be a reasonable approach to protect them from attackers. Unfortunately, these devices
commonly have low power, small amounts of available memory, and limited processing
capabilities. These factors can prove prohibitive to adding new security features. As a
result, researchers have begun to place added emphasis on introducing security measures
into IoT systems to help safeguard them from cyberattacks [78] [151] [191]. One area of
research that has drawn attention as a potential cybercrime countermeasure for IoT devices
is Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs).
A PUF, which will be explained in-depth later in this dissertation, is a device that uses
inherent variations caused by the manufacturing process to create unique and unclonable
IDs. The PUF accepts an input “challenge” and in return outputs an associated “response”.
Due to intrinsic variations in the devices, a challenge that is given to two different copies
of a PUF should result in different responses. This uniqueness property of PUFs can be
seen in Figure 1.2. In the figure, the same challenge is sent to two copies of the same
PUF. Each copy is a specific instance of a particular PUF design. The copies are therefore
identical from a design standpoint. However, the outputs of the PUFs are not equivalent.
This behavior can be utilized to implement various security measures.

Figure 1.2: Uniqueness Property of PUF (previously published in [98])

Researchers have proposed PUF designs using a variety of techniques and implementation mediums. The common ground between the designs is leveraging intrinsic variations
that should be unique to each instance of a device. Figure 1.3 contains a visual representation of the taxonomy of PUF designs along with examples of each.
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Figure 1.3: Taxonomy of PUF Designs

Silicon based PUFs are one popular medium. Silicon-based designs are based on
transistor-level variations in gate delays or initial values of memory units. Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF [47] and Arbiter PUF [99] are notable delay-based PUFs while SRAM [53]
and butterfly [53] are examples of memory-based designs. Other PUF designs are based
around sensors or energy havesters. These components are designed to react to external
conditions and in response generate an output which depending on the application can be
used for sensing (sensors) or power generation (energy harvesters). A couple of examples include PUFs based on microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) gyroscopes [178]
and photodiodes [139]. Other proposed PUF designs do not easily fit within the previously
mentioned categories. One example is the RF-PUF which uses machine learning to identify
the transmitter of a signal based on unique radio frequency (RF) properties [25]. Another
example is the optical PUF which fires a laser at a transparent film [42]. The resulting
speckle pattern will be unique to each film and can thus used to generate a response which
in turn is unique to each copy of the PUF. All of these designs will be covered in more
detail in the next chapter.

1.3

Motivation

Various cyber-physical systems including IoT devices and vehicles face some of the same
challenges when it comes to implementing security measures. Namely, they tend to face
similar resource constraints when compared to larger computing systems. This necessitates application specific implementation of security features. Due to the combination of
real-time constraints and limited computational resources that are typical of these areas, researchers have sought ways to implement security primitives while minimizing the amount
of additional hardware and computational resources that would be required.
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are one such area show promise as security
solution. Previous works have shown how PUFs could be used to securely generate and
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store secret keys [45, 155] while other works have proposed PUF-based security protocols
for use in protecting sensor nodes [11] or securing radio-frequency identification (RFID)
systems [17].
While PUFs could prove to be a novel security solution, their integration would not be
completely seamless. PUFs are commonly based on CMOS ICs which require dedicated
hardware to function correctly. This dedicated hardware results in additional costs in terms
of hardware and power consumption. The performance of the device itself could suffer due
to the additional overhead required to operate and/or communicate with the PUF. Therefore,
a PUF designed for use in cyber-physical systems should also give special consideration
towards reducing these costs as much as possible. The goal of this work is the creation of
a class of PUFs whose integration with various sorts of cyber-physical devices would incur
a minimal cost in the form of additional hardware.
One potential way to achieve this would be to try to limit the amount of special purpose hardware that is solely dedicated to implementing security features. This could help
minimize both the costs of adding the hardware and the resources needed to interact with
it. The core challenge then becomes how to remove hardware without similarly removing
functionality. Our solution is to take the novel approach of designing PUFs from components that already exist within the device.
Designing a PUF from existing components would help address some of the concerns
associated with integrating more established PUF designs. Additional physical hardware is
potentially no longer necessary for the PUF’s addition to the system. Furthermore, PUFs
are commonly designed at the transistor level which puts some special constraints on the
manufacture of each individual PUF. Those constraints are not present if the PUF is instead
manufactured from existing components. The proposed approach should also have the
added benefit of simplifying the PUF’s future integration with these technologies since the
required underlying hardware would in theory already be present.
When creating these novel PUF designs it is important to use components with as
widespread adoption as possible. Otherwise the range of devices that could incorporate
the proposed PUF without requiring any additional hardware could be severely limited. A
given device can typically be expected to contain some combination processing units, sensors, and actuators. Furthermore those devices will occasionally be integrated with multiple
types of energy harvesting devices including solar cells, thermoelectrics, and piezoelectric
devices [172]. These devices were integrated so that they could be used in various applications such as power generation and sensing. The performance of these sensors and
energy harvesting devices can vary between individual instances. This variance can be
traced back to intrinsic variations in the components that are caused by the manufacturing
process. These variations could potentially make the sensors and energy harvesters a good
candidate for PUF creation.
By pursuing this approach, the ultimate end goal is creating the ability to add security
features to devices and systems without needing to add any additional hardware. In effect,
a device’s existing energy harvesters and sensors serve as a source of security in addition
to their original purpose of environmental monitoring and power generation. To broaden
the appeal of using PUFs created from existing components, this dissertation proposes
PUF designs which are derived from three different components: piezo sensors, thermistor
temperature sensors, and solar cells. This approach allows the work to be applicable to a
6

much wider selection of cyber-physical devices than if we had based our proposed designs
on only a single choice from the previously mentioned components. Figure 1.4 illustrates
where our proposed PUF designs would be located within the broader PUF taxonomy that
was previously shown in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.4: Classification of Proposed PUF Designs

As a proof of concept, we have created prototypes of the different proposed PUF designs and evaluated their performance metrics to measure their viability for use as a PUF.
Each PUF design generates a single 128-bit response that should be unique to the specific
PUF copy. The designs achieve this by directly leveraging the intrinsic variations between
individual instances of each component. Furthermore, we demonstrate why PUFs should
be seriously considered as an option to address known security vulnerabilities that do not
already have easy and obvious solutions. This is expressed by considering the Controller
Area Network (CAN) within vehicles as a case study. CAN was designed without any security considerations. Researchers have shown how its lack of built-in security features can
be exploited to attack vehicles. We propose a security framework for the CAN bus that is
based on PUFs. By leveraging the unique properties of PUFs our framework is able to add
security features that by design are not previously supported. The use of PUFs allows us to
avoid changing the CAN protocol itself and thus prevent the need for drastic redesigns of
core vehicular infrastructure.

1.4

Contributions

The following contributions have been made so far in developing hardware security primitives for cyber-physical systems.
Contribution 1: Proposal of a novel physically unclonable function (PUF) response
balancing algorithm The algorithm is able to securely generate a 128-bit response. It requires only eight copies of a given sensor or energy harvester. Each response bit represents
the result of a comparison between groupings of three sensors or energy harvesters. A total
of 128 comparisons are made in a predetermined pattern. Each comparison is unique so
7

that knowledge of bit location’s value would not immediately reveal the value of any other
bit locations.
Contribution 2: Proposal of novel piezo sensor based PUF circuit design methodology We have proposed a PUF design methodology that leverages the intrinsic variations
piezo sensors to create a PUF which generates a 128-bit response. The sensors can be represented by an equivalent circuit whose impedance will differ due to intrinsic variations.
We measure the impedance values by applying an AC voltage. We created three prototypes
and evaluated their performance over a temperature range of -20°C to 0°C and 25°C to
80°C.
Contribution 3: Proposal of novel thermistor temperature sensor based PUF circuit design methodology We have proposed a PUF design methodology that leverages the
intrinsic variations in thermistor temperature sensors to create a PUF which generates a
128-bit response. The sensors directly react to the ambient temperature by varying their resistance. Intrinsic variations will produce differences in resistance despite having the same
external stimuli. We measure those differences via a voltage dividing circuit. We created
five prototypes and evaluated their performance over both a temperature range of -20°C to
80°C and relative humidity of 30% to 100%. We also performed Monte Carlo Simulations
on 1000 simulated PUF instances to evaluate the uniqueness.
Contribution 4: Proposal of novel solar cell based PUF circuit design methodology
We have proposed a PUF design methodology that leverages the intrinsic variations in solar
cells to create a PUF. Each solar cell generates a voltage based on the intensity of the light
shining on it. These voltages will differ between cells due to intrinsic variations. The
proposed PUF generates a 128-bit response. The proposed design should show resiliency
to changes in temperature and light intensity while also being flexible enough to work with
a variety of solar cells.
Contribution 5: Evaluation of solar cell materials for the creation of novel PUF
circuits We evaluated three common solar cell materials to determine their suitability for
the creation of PUFs. The solar cell materials materials were monocrystalline sillicone,
polycrystalline silicon, and amorphous silicon. We created three copies of each of the three
different solar cell based designs for a total of nine PUF copies to be evaluated. Performance was evaluated over a temperature range of -20°C to 80°C and relative humidity of
30% to 100% and a light intensity range of 40 Watts/m2 to 90 Watts/m2 . We were also able
to perform Monte Carlo Simulations on 1000 simulated instances to evaluate the uniqueness of one of the materials.
Contribution 6: Proposal of a novel PUF-Based Controller Area Network (CAN)
security framework We demonstrate how PUFs could be integrated into a a cyber-physical
system such as a vehicular CAN bus to provide security features for communication between nodes. Our proposed framework does not require any modification to the existing
CAN protocol. Our novel approach also significantly reduces overhead in the form of both
the amount of CAN frames and the amount of time required for operation when compared
to existing approaches.
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1.5

Dissertation Outline

This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides background information on
security approaches in cyber-physical systems as well as specifics about PUF-based approaches; Chapter 3 explains our proposed method for creating a PUF from piezo sensors; Chapter 4 presents our thermistor temperature sensor based PUF design methodology; Chapter 5 presents our solar cell based PUF designs while also providing a relative
performance evaluation of different solar cell materials; Chapter 6 explains how leveraging
PUFs could help improve vehicular security and presents our PUF-based security framework for a vehicular CAN bus; Chapter 7 concludes this work and provides some possible
directions for future research.
The work presented in Chapter 3 was previously published in [94] “C. Labrado and
H. Thapliyal, Design of a Piezoelectric-Based Physically Unclonable Function for IoT Security, IEEE Internet of Things Journal © 2018 IEEE”. The work published in Chapter
4 was previously published in [98]. The work in Chapter 5 was previously published in
[93] “C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of
Solar Cell Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science, published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”.
The work in Chapter 6 has been accepted for publication in ACM JETC [97]. All of these
works have contributed to the first two chapters in varying capacities. In additon, some
portions of Chapters 1 and 2 were previously published in [96] “C. Labrado and H. Thapliyal, Hardware Security Primitives for Vehicles, IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine ©
2019 IEEE”. A provisional patent has been granted for the design methodology [161]. The
piezo sensor work was also a hardware demonstration at a conference [95] and the security
framework has been accepted for a hardware demonstration in the upcoming iteration of
the conference.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter we will discuss various aspects of security as they relate to IoT and vehicles
and highlight some of the proposed hardware solutions. The information presented is intended to provide a general understanding of current hardware security approaches in the
field. Some popular areas of vehicular security research such as modifying network protocols [51] [169] [52] [102] [157] and the creation of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
[122] [30] [125] will mostly not be covered as they do not necessarily fall under the category of hardware solutions. We will solely focus on the the topics that are more closely
hardware aspects of security. This information includes security properties, cryptographic
algorithms, and hardware solutions. Later sections in this chapter will focus on various
aspects of PUFs including various design methodology, evaluation metrics, and security
applications.

2.1

Security Properties

Security itself can be described as consisting of five basic properties: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, availability, and non-repudiation. A system that is completely secure
will be able to guarantee all five of the properties. These properties are described below in
terms of messages being sent between two parties within a communication system:
• Confidentiality - This is the guarantee that no outside party is able to determine the
contents of messages sent during communication between two corresponding parties.
The implementation of this property prevents any third party from eavesdropping
on a conversation. A common method for implementing this property is to use a
chosen cryptosystem to encrypt messages between two parties. In their encrypted
state, the messages should not reveal any information about the actual content of the
message. Only the communicating parties should be able to decrypt the encrypted
messages. Therefore, as long as attackers cannot decrypt the encrypted messages
they are effectively prevented from eavesdropping.
• Integrity - This is the guarantee that all received messages are correct. The original contents of the messages have not been alterted or tampered with in any way.
If any tampering has occurred, then it should be detected by the system. As will
10

be explained below, this property tends to be closely associated with authenticity.
Hash functions, which will also be explained further down, are one somewhat simple
method for implementing integrity.
• Authenticity - This is the guarantee that all communicating entities are who they
claim to be. The correct application of this property will protect against a malicious
third party attempting to forge messages or impersonate one of the communicating
parties. This property is closely associated with integrity because it many cases it is
somewhat useless to implement one property without the other. For example, there
is not much utility in knowing a message came from a specific person (authenticity)
without also knowing that the message has not been tampered with (integrity).
• Availability - This is the guarantee that the communication system will always be
available and able to deliver messages between two communicating parties. A common type of attack against this property is a denial of service (DoS) attack in which
an attacker attempts to restrict or even completely halt the availability of the overall
communication system. This is accomplished by attempting to overload the system
through flooding it with illegitimate messages to the point that legitimate messages
are either delivered too slow to be useful or simply not delivered at all. Attacks that
send illegitimate message from multiple sources are known as distributed denial of
service (DDoS) flooding attacks [189].
• Non-Repudiation - This is the guarantee that either party is not able to deny any aspect of its communication. This means that if one party sent or received a message
then it cannot deny that the message was sent or received, respectively. In some respects this property is more focused on protecting the communicating parties from
each other, rather than protecting both parties from a malicious third party. One example of this property is it would be impossible for one party to send a malicious
message and then deny it was the one who sent the message. Possible implementations of this property can include the creation of message signatures that are generated by a trusted third party [87].
Guaranteeing these properties can be very complex and costly. These difficulties can
be further exacerbated when these properties are trying to be introduced to technologies
and protocols that were not originally designed with security in mind. The CAN bus for
example does not guarantee any of these properties [60] and can therefore present a major
security risk that is not easily fixed.

2.2

Cryptographic Algorithms

Any description of security is likely to include a mention of cryptography. Cryptographic
algorithms form the basis of cryptosystems and can allow data to be stored and transmitted
in a secure format. A strong cryptographic algorithm will be based on a mathematical
problem which is considered to be computationally infeasible. A well known example is the
RSA cryptosystem [137] which is based around the difficulty in factoring large numbers.
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The most common types of cryptographic algorithms for encryption and decryption are
symmetric-key and asymmetric-key. In addition to those two types of algorithms, there
are also secure hash functions which can have their own unique applications. A visual
representation of these categories is shown in Figure 2.1.
The computational resources (power, memory, speed, etc.) available in IoT and vehicles
can be somewhat less when compared to what is available in a conventional computer
system. These reduced resources can place constraints on what cryptographic algorithms
can be used in these resource constrained applications. For this reason, a relatively new field
of cryptosystems called lightweight cryptography (LWC) has been created [148] [115].
LWC schemes are designed in ways that are designed to reduce the amount of memory,
latency, power, etc. required for computation. This is typically realized by reducing key
sizes, simplifying the number of rounds in block ciphers, and reducing the complexity of
required operations.
All of the algorithms that will be mentioned in this section are examples of cryptosystems that have been implemented in various existing security schemes.

Figure 2.1: Categories of Cryptographic Algorithms

12

2.2.1

Symmetric-key Cryptography

Symmetric-key cryptosystems are so named because they use the same key for the encryption and decryption of messages. This is a straightforward approach, but it does have the
issue where the sender and the receiver of each message must already have obtained a copy
of key through some type of secure channel. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
algorithm is a commonly used symmetric-key cryptosystem for transmitting information
over insecure channels. AES allows for key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits. Another downside to symmetric-key cryptography is those methods can require generating a new key for
every message.

2.2.2

Asymmetric-key Cryptography

Asymmetric-key cryptosystems (also known as public key) use different keys for the encryption and decryption of messages. The encryption key is publicly displayed so that any
entity may use it. The decryption key is kept private and is therefore only known by its
owner. There is a mathematical relationship between the keys that allows the public key
to be easily generated from the private key, but not vice versa. This eliminates the need in
symmetric-key cryptosystems for either using secure channels to share keys or generating
a new shared key for each message. The aforementioned RSA cryptosystem is a public
key cryptosystem based on factoring large numbers. Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC)
is another approach which is based on elliptic curves. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange
[117] protocol has a variation based on elliptic curves called Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH).

2.2.3

Hash Functions

Hash functions take an input of arbitrary length and outputs a result of fixed length. Because
the output is a fixed length, there is the possibility of a collision occurring in which two
different inputs result in the same output hash. A strong hash function will have very small
odds of a collision occurring and it will be designed in such a way that the smallest alteration to the input will produce a wildly different output hash. Hash functions are one-way
functions so they can not be used in a similar method to symmetric-key and asymmetric-key
cryptography. Hash functions can instead be used for verification purposes. The simplest
application of hash functions is verifying the integrity of data. Hash functions can take
inputs of arbitrary size so a large set of data could be hashed to generate a much smaller
hash output. The smallest change to the data should result in a wildly different hash output.
In this way, data can be checked for unauthorized tampering by having to only compare
hash outputs rather than the entirety of the original data input. WHIRLPOOL [15] is one
popular hash function used today. WHIRLPOOL takes an input message less than 2256 bits
long and produces an output that is 512 bits. The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family of
hash function are another example of commonly used hash functions.
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2.3

Vehicular Communication Networks

Modern vehicles continue to become smarter and more complex with increasing arrays
of sensors and electrical devices that must be able to communicate with each other. The
burgeoning emergence of a larger ecosystem of autonomous vehicles and smart cities will
give rise to an additional need for vehicles to have external communication abilities.

2.3.1

Internal Communication

Multiple types of communication networks have been proposed and or implemented to
allow the various vehicular hardware devices such as electronic control units (ECUs) and
sensors to communicate in a fast and efficient manner. We will discuss some of the more
popular network standards such as FlexRay, (Media Oriented Systems Transport (MOST),
Local Interconnect Network (LIN), and the previously mentioned Controller Area Network
(CAN) bus. More in-depth descriptions of these networks and other existing networks can
be found in existing works [128] [164].
• CAN (Controller Area Network) - CAN was developed in the 1980’s as a bus system to simplify the process of connecting multiple ECUs within a vehicle. Previously, vehicles used dedicated point-to-point wiring which begins to result in large
and expensive wiring harnesses as more and more electronic devices are added to
the vehicle. The introduction of CAN allowed manufacturers to reduce the wiring
cost, complexity, and weight of vehicular systems [65]. The general utility and cost
effective performance of CAN has allowed it to remain widely used to this day.
• FlexRay - As vehicular technology continued to evolve, the performance requirements of new advanced control and safety systems were beginning to exceed CAN’s
capabilities. FlexRay was designed to meet the performance requirements of both
these new systems and future systems that will emerge in the next generation of vehicles [66]. Current applications of FlexRay are performance critical subsystems such
as adaptive cruise control, high-performance powertrain, and anti-lock braking systems (ABS) [66] [111]. The increased performance of FlexRay, however is offset by
FlexRay’s increased cost when compared to CAN. At least for now, FlexRay is only
a partial successor to CAN as the complete replacement of CAN with FlexRay in vehicular networks would be cost prohibitive. CAN will remain the preferred protocol
in subsystems whose performance requirements do not exceed CAN’s capabilities.
• MOST (Media Oriented Systems Transport) - MOST was developed by the MOST
Cooperation in 1998 as a communication network to be primarily used in communication between multimedia devices found in infotainment systems within vehicles.
These multimedia devices such as radios, GPS navigation, video displays, and entertainment systems tend require large amounts of data which facilitated the need
for a multimedia-centric network [126]. Previously, the only versions of the MOST
protocol were MOST25 and MOST50. The newer version, MOST150, has since
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been introduced and has superior performance capabilities (e.g. speed and bandwidth) when compared to the existing version. In addition to improved performance,
MOST150 added support for Ethernet packets and MAC addressing [85] [34].
• LIN (Local Interconnect Network) - LIN is a somewhat newer type of bus protocol which was first developed via a collaboration between automakers Audi, BMW,
DaimlerChrysler, Volkswagen, and Volvo [140] as a low-cost network for use in noncritical subsystems. These non-critical subsystems do not require the same measure
of speed and reliability as do the more performance-intensive subsystems that are
typically connected via the CAN bus. By using LIN for minor subsystems in conjunction with CAN, manufacturors are able to save costs while in effect not truly
impacting the functionality of these subsystems. Applications of LIN tend to include
somewhat simple mechatronic subsystems like door locks, trunk releases, and seat
controls [126].

2.3.2

External Communication

Advances in vehicular technology are trending toward the need for the creation of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). VANETs are an emerging type of communication network
that allow for the integration of vehicles and other entities such as Road-Side Infrastructure (RSI) into an overall communication network. These networks have a myriad of uses
such as communication between autonomous vehicles and smart traffic through communication between transit authorities and vehicles. In the future, these networks could be
used to aid autonomous vehicles in navigating roadways while requiring little to no input
from the vehicles occupants. Much like with the internal communication networks, these
VANETs have their own security vulnerabilities which much be addressed to provide protection against attacks. Further information on VANETs including their implementations,
security vulnerabilities, and potential security solutions can be found in the following works
[165] [43] [136] [6].

2.4
2.4.1

Hardware Security Modules
Trusted Platform Modules

Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) are cryptographic co-processors designed to integrate
security into larger computer systems. They are now commonly included in computers as
a secure hardware solution to fulfill security needs. The specifications for a TPM were
standardized by ISO/IEC 11889 [150]. TPMs are self-contained in their operation meaning
they are not reliant on the operating system used by the overall computer system to operate.
This prevents the TPM from being compromised by any security vulnerabilities that might
be present in the computer’s operating system or applications. The security provided by a
TPM is based around keys and as such the TPM provides multiple crypto engines to allow
for symmetric and asymmetric key generation, encryption, and decryption. TPMs include
other hardware features such as a random number generator and secure non-volatile storage. The current version of TPM is 2.0, which required the inclusion of new cryptographic
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algorithms. Previous TPM versions only required RSA and the SHA-1 hash function. TPM
2.0 requires those algorithms in addition to AES-128 for symmetric cryptography, ECC algorithms for asymmetric cryptography, and the SHA-256 hashing function. Figure 2.2
contains a representation of the basic components that will be generally included in a given
TPM 2.0 implementation. Several of the security features provided by TPMs for computer
systems are also desirable in vehicular communication systems. Unfortunately, the integration of TPMs and vehicles can be more complicated than a direct inclusion of existing
TPMs into vehicles. The unique challenges of vehicular security necessitate the development of TPMs that are specially designed for use in vehicles.

Figure 2.2: TPM 2.0 Components (© 2019 IEEE)

2.4.2

Vehicular Hardware Modules

One notable area of vehicular security research is the creation of security modules that
can be introduced to the unsecured buses found in vehicles. These modules attempt to
implement a measure of security without incurring significant costs. The additional security
hardware can be designed for operation either within a chosen communication network, or
as a gateway of sorts between multiple networks. These modules aim to provide a secure
hardware to facilitate secure communication between nodes in both internal and external
vehicular communication networks. In addition, the modules are capable of generating
and storing cryptographic keys. The unique security challenges facing vehicles prevent
the direct adaptation of existing trusted platform modules (TPMs) from normal computers
to vehicles. Hardware security modules for vehicles instead must be specially designed
so that the modules may be effectively integrated into vehicular communication networks.
However, this does not mean that vehicular TPMs will be completely unique from existing
implementations. Both existing TPMs and their proposed vehicular implementations tend
to share multiple hardware components such as storage mediums and crypto engines.
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Modules Within Singular Networks
The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus allows multiple ECUs to communicate with each
other. CAN was not originally designed to include any sort of security features. This
presents a major security concern as the ECUs connected to the CAN bus tend to be associated with critical systems such as braking and steering. An attacker who was able to
gain access to the CAN bus would have numerous options for causing harm to a vehicle,
its occupants, and other motorists. Modifying the protocols used by the communication
networks has drawn interest from researchers as a method for introducing security [51]
[169] [52] [102] [157]. The downside to modifying the protocol is it introduces the potential to increase the amount of computations that must be performed by the system. This
increase could reduce the speed of communication between components and overall harm
the performance of the system and as a result may not be adopted by manufacturers.
Other approaches have focused on the inclusion of new hardware. Researchers in [179]
have proposed a vehicular hardware security module. A diagram of the module’s architecture is shown in Figure 2.3. Their module is a general-purpose cryptographic co-processor
designed for use in vehicles. The module can be combined with the individual ECUs to
provide protection by connecting the proposed module to an in-vehicle communication network. The proposed hardware security module (HSM) was designed to include dedicated
resources for the full range of cryptographic algorithms (asymmetric cryptographic, symmetric cryptography, and hash functions). The asymmetric crypto engine is ECC-256 and
is commonly used for the creation and verification of digital signatures. The symmetric
crypto engine used is AES-128 and allows the HSM to provide symmetric encryption and
decryption. WHIRLPOOL is the cryptographic hash function provided by the HSM. The
inclusion of a hash function allows the HSM to both generate and verify “fingerprints”
such as plain hash and hash-based message authentication code (HMACs). The HSM also
includes a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) that provides pseudo-random numbers to be used during normal operations. The PRNG generates these numbers from an
internal algorithm that can be seeded either internally by a physical true random number
generator (TRNG) or by an external source such as an external TRNG during production
of the HSM itself. Internally, the HSM has both unsecured RAM to act as a key buffer
and nonvolitile memory (NVM) to allow for secure storage of keys. These features are
kept behind a so-called cryptographic boundary that is separate from the actual application core that communicates with other ECUs attached to the in-vehicle communication
system. The decision to include multiple crypto engines effectively allows the module to
act as a general-purpose crypto-processor which can be reused in a variety of applications.
The module shown in Figure 2.3 is referred to as “full” because it has everything needed
to secure vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. Additionally, the researchers in
[179] proposed variations of the module known as “medium” and “light”. The “medium”
variation is focused only on the security of communication within the vehicle. The “light”
variation is designed to only secure interactions between ECUs and the sensors and actuators.
A different type of hardware module is one that is an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
[32]. When inserted into the CAN network, this module is able to identify all of the ECUs
based on the inimitable characteristics of their signals. The module would then be able to
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Figure 2.3: Hardware Security Module (HSM) Architecture from [179]

identify malicious ECUs that have been inserted into the network. What sets this IDS apart
from other implementations is it would not require any change to the existing hardware of
the ECUs and it does not actually require modifications to the CAN protocol. The main
drawback to this module is the protocol used by the ECUs must still be changed. ECUs in
the network would have to use the extended frame format of CAN. ECUs would require a
firmware update to switch from the normal frame format that they currently use in order to
be compatible with the proposed IDS.
Modules Between Networks
A slightly higher level form of security module is the introduction of a security gateway that
allows for secure communication between different networks within the vehicle. An example of this method can be found in [180]. In their proposed system, each valid controller
within a communication network is assigned a security certificate which has been digitally
signed by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). The gateway is able to use the public key which is associated with the OEM to verify the validity of the controllers. Messages
sent from invalid controllers then have the option of either being processed separately, or
just simply discarded.

2.5

Security Attacks and Countermeasures

This section will only address a selection of the types security attacks that are relevant to
the hardware primitives that were discussed in previous sections. This is intended to be
more of a general overview of the types of security vulnerabilities present in each field.
More thorough and specific explanations can be found in existing works which are solely
dedicated to this topic such as [123], [184] and [177] for IoT, and [153], [3], and [83] for
vehicles.
Providing security is a challenging problem that is not readily solvable by conventional
solutions. Even just the diagnosis of security threats has required the development of novel
intrusion detection methods [121]. However, the security issues in sub fields such as those
facing vehicles vehicles are not as isolated as they might appear. Similar security concerns
are actually being raised in a variety of other areas. This general trend is a direct response
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to society’s adoption of the Internet of Things (IoT). The addition of smart features to an
increasing number of consumer electronics has also introduced security vulnerabilities and
concerns that were not present during the designing of the original devices.
Developing methods to combat these new challenges has drawn interest from a number
of researchers. This has included classical approaches such as designing hardware security
chips for mobile devices [74] and secure firmware validation and update schemes for personal home devices [31]. Other researchers have even explored novel PUF-based solutions
such as creating device authentication schemes for IoT-enabled medical devices [187] and
radio-frequency (RF) communication between nodes in a wireless network [24]. A method
has even been proposed for integrating PUFs with blockchain technology to make it suitable for providing security in IoT devices [120].
Despite interest from researchers, the level of security preparations are still not sufficient to match the security vulnerabilities that will arise with both the continuing conversion
of previously offline consumer electronics int IoT-enabled devices and advances in the sophistication of a device’s IoT-compatible functionality. The task is a daunting one and we
believe novel technologies such as PUFs have the potential to make a much larger impact
in this area than they have made in security solutions in more classical systems. A later
chapter in this work provides an example by showing how the inclusion of PUFs can introduce security features into a intra-vehicle network while minimizing any changes in its
normal operation.

2.5.1

IoT Security Concerns

The design and use of IoT devices introduce security vulnerabilities that are not present in
classical computing systems. One source of these vulnerabilities is IoT devices typically
have limited computing resources. A second source of vulnerabilities is those devices
can almost be commonly found in relatively insecure locations. Their placement in these
locations can make it much easier for an attacker to physically access the device [184].
Limited Computing Resources
IoT devices tend to have limited computing resources. This serves as a bit of a hurdle when
it comes to data protection. Various types of cryptographic schemes are usually used for
data protection. Unfortunately, the limited resources available in IoT devices can make it
difficult to implement popular encryption schemes while still meeting the real-time requirements that characterize many IoT applications. For this reason, researchers have proposed
lightweight cryptography (LWC) which is desired specifically for implementation in resource constrained devices [148] [115]. LWC schemes attempt to provide an acceptable
level of cryptographic security while reducing the amount of computational resources that
are required to implement it in comparison to cryptosystems that are commonly used in
applications that have more computational resources available. This is typically achieved
by making design decision that include some combination of reducing key sizes, reducing
the complexity of required intermediate operations, and reducing the number of rounds in
block ciphers. PRESENT [21] and CLEFIA [146] are two examples of LWC families of
block ciphers.
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Figure 2.4: Taxonomy of Vehicular Security Attacks as Described in [22]

Insecure Location
IoT devices can often be placed in locations that are easily accessible by attackers. This
means an attacker gaining physical access to a device should be treated as a realistic threat.
With physical access to a device, an attacker could attempt to reverse engineer cryptographic and/or processing units on the device. As a countermeasure, researchers have
developed hardware obfuscation techniques to mask the operations being carried out by
those units and therefore make them resistant to reverse engineering. One method that has
been proposed involves dynamically changing the order in which a processing unit receives
data [41]. This makes what operations are currently being performed less obvious to the
attacker. Other researchers have proposed using the responses from PUFs to either swap
internal wirings [176] or reconfigure internal logic [185].

2.5.2

Vehicular Security Concerns

Figure 2.4 shows an attack taxonomy from [22] that has been modified for vehicles. The
taxonomy provides the general outline of an attack including who the attackers could be,
what tools they might use in the attack, the actions taken with those tools, and the attackers’ overall objective for the attack. For the sake of brevity in this section, “communication
between parties” is used in the general sense to refer to any type of vehicular communication that could occur such as between ECUs connected via a bus or between vehicles via a
wireless network.
Eavesdropping Attacks
These types of attacks involve an attacker “listening in” to communications between two
parties. In the context of vehicular security this could involve listening to communication
channels such as the CAN bus or intra-vehicle messages. If these channels are insecure then
an attacker could obtain sensitive information being passed through the network or could
determine how to forge communications to impersonate one of the parties. The common
countermeasure to eavesdropping has been to make sure all communications are encrypted
20

so attackers and other third parties are unable to gain any useful information. Implementing
message encryption in these networks can be difficult due to limitations that are intrinsic to
their design, such as messages being broadcast to all connected nodes. The integration of
Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) is one possible solution. These modules would provide
all of the hardware resources necessary to integrate multiple types of cryptosystems. Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) could be useful as a way of both securely storing and
generating keys to be used by the cryptosystem.
Data Tampering Attacks
These attacks occur when an attacker is able to modify messages between two parties without being detected. Consequences of this attack could include altering sensor readings
within a vehicle or changing relative location information sent by a vehicle. Just like with
eavesdropping, message encryption can help prevent tampering attacks.
Impersonation/Forgery Attacks
These attacks are when an attacker is able to successfully impersonate a communicating
party. These attacks are potentially more severe than data tampering attacks because the attacker is able to completely forge new messages rather than only being able to alter existing
messages. For example, an attacker could request sensitive information that would compromise the security of the vehicle. The attacked vehicle believes it is communicating with
a trusted party and unknowingly sends the requested information straight to the attacker.
Some counter measures include employing public-key cryptosystems and trusted-third parties like certificate authorities that can verify the authenticity of a message’s author.
Man in the Middle Attacks
In some respects this attack is a combination of the previous attacks. In this attack scenario
an attacker is able to both intercept and forward messages between two parties. The two
parties are not aware that their messages are being routed through a third party. The parties
become vulnerable to all of the previously mentioned attacks. The attacker also has the
option of rerouting messages or selectively preventing certain messages from reaching their
intended recipient. These attacks take on more significance in vehicular ad hoc networks
(VANETs) due to intra-vehicle communication, the variety of information that might need
to be shared, and the consequences that could result. A strong countermeasure to these
attacks would be using a protocol that is non-forwardable thereby preventing the basis for
this attack.
Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
The purpose of this attack is to prevent the normal use of a network or service. This
is commonly achieved by flooding the target with enough illegitimate messages to cause
legitimate messages to be slowly delivered if not dropped altogether. In-vehicle bus communication networks like CAN are particularly vulnerable due to their broadcast nature
and lack of a method of establishing authenticity. A countermeasure against DoS attacks
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would be introducing a method for verifying the authenticity of nodes in the network [156].
Unverified nodes could be suspended from the network.

2.6

Physically Unclonable Functions

First proposed in [131], a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) can be thought of as a
type of hash function in which a given input will result in a specific output. In PUFs, inputs
are known as “challenges” and outputs are “responses”. Collectively, a challenge and its
associated response are known as challenge-response pair (CRP). The reason these functions are called “physically unclonable” is because PUFs are designed in such a way where
it is impossible to create multiple PUFs that will be have identical outputs for all possible
inputs. This is because PUFs use the minor variations inherent to device manufacture to
generate their uniqueness property. For example, in a circuit based PUF these physical
variations can include qualities such as signal propagation delay times present in wires and
logic gates. A set of ideal PUFs with identical designs given identical challenges should
have a unique response for each individual PUF. This uniqueness property is illustrated in
Figure 2.5.

Figure 2.5: Example of Uniqueness Property of PUF (© 2018 IEEE)

In Figure 2.5 each PUF is given a challenge denoted as C1. The response of the first
PUF is R1 while the response of the second PUF is R2. As depicted in the Figure, different
CRPs have been produced despite providing what should be identical PUFs with identical
challenges. A PUF that is considered strong will have a large number of viable CRPs while
a weak PUF will have a very limited number of possible CRPs. A PUF should be well
designed enough that there is a minimal chance of CPR overlap between instances of a
given PUF. For example, if a weak PUF produces a single 128-bit response, then the odds
of having two PUFs both produce the exact same response should be 1 in 2128 . This is
similar for strong PUFs except with the added possibility that copies of a given PUF could
have some common CRPs. These concerns are related to a PUF’s uniqueness property
which will be discussed later in this section.
The inherent properties of PUFs make them attractive for use in security applications.
An attacker would be forced to obtain the actual PUF itself if he or she wanted to use it in
an attack as it would be impossible to create an exact copy of the desired PUF. Researchers
have explored incorporating PUFs into a wide range of areas including key storage and
generation, signature creation, and authenticity verification.
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PUFs have commonly been implemented on application specific integrated circuits
(ASICs) [190] or on field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) [53] as transistor level device
variations caused by the IC manufacturing process have been observed to be suitable for
creating PUFs. Additional implementations have been proposed which are based on a wide
range of devices including microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) based sensors [178]
[12], device touchscreens [143], photodiodes [139], and solar cells [10].

2.6.1

PUF Evaluation Metrics

The following metrics are important measures of a PUF’s performance. As the designs
proposed in this dissertation are all weak PUFs, the equations and their explanations are
provided in the context of evaluating weak PUF designs which produce a single response.
Reliability Testing
The reliability of a PUF is a measure of how well it will produce the correct response.
The ideal reliability value of a PUF is 100%. This indicates that the PUF will never produce
an erroneous response to a given challenge. Anything less than 100% is an indication that
some portion of bits in the response will be flipped from their correct value. For exampe, if
a PUF has a reliability of 95% then 5% of the bits in the response will be erroenous while
the other 95% will be correct. The following equation (first described in [110]) is used to
calculate the reliability for a n-bit response of:
0

m

1 X HD(Ri , Ri,t )
× 100%
Reliability = 100% −
m t=1
n

(2.1)

In this equation, Ri is a chosen reference response produced by a specific PUF instance
0
i. Ri is a response generated under different environmental conditions. A total of m responses are collected with different environmental conditions. Each of these generated
0
0
0
0
responses (Ri,1 , , Ri,2 , ... ,, Ri,m ) are compared to the reference response Ri . HD(Ri , Ri,t )
is the hamming distance (HD) between the reference response (Ri ) and the t-th generated
0
response (Ri,t ) of PUF i.
Uniformity Testing
Another standard PUF metric is uniformity. The uniformity of a PUF describes how “balanced” its responses are, i.e., what is the prevalence of 1’s vs. 0’s in the bits of the responses. Ideally, there will be an equal number of 1’s and 0’s to maximize the entrophy
and thus maximimize the difficulty for an attacker trying to guess the value of a given bit.
This ideal scenario is represented by a uniformity value of 50%. The following equation
(first described in [110]) is used to calculate the uniformity of a n-bit response:
n

1X
ri,l × 100%
U nif ormity =
n l=1
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(2.2)

In the above equation, ri,l represents the l-th bit of a n-bit long response generated by
PUF instance i. In order to obtain a general uniformity of PUF we averaged together all
the readings for a given test.
Uniqueness Testing
As described in [110], the uniqueness of a PUF represents the ability to distinguish one
particular instance of a PUF from a group of PUFs of the same type. The ideal uniqueness
value is 50%. The following equation is used to calculate uniqueness:
k−1 X
k
X
HD(Ri , Rj )
2
× 100%
U niqueness =
k(k − 1) i=1 j=i+1
n

(2.3)

The above equation determines the average hamming distance (HD) among k total
PUFs. Ri and Rj represent n-bit responses produced by PUFs i and j, respectively where
i 6= j.
It should be noted evaluating the uniqueness of a PUF design typically requires orders of magnitude more copies of a PUF to be created than what are feasible in a research
context. For this reason, it is common practice to perform Monte Carlo simulations to generate enough unique simulated PUF copies to have a sufficiently large enough population
to perform uniqueness testing. The simulated PUF copies are directly created from data
describing the physical characteristics of the PUFs. That data should allow for the creation
of a normal population of simulated devices that would accurately match what the actual
physical population should be.

2.6.2

PUF Design Taxonomy

Silicon Based PUFs
Numerous PUF designed have already been presented in the literature. Existing PUFs have
generally been silicon based. Those PUFs rely on transistor level variations that occur
during the manufacturing process. These variations manifest themselves as non-uniform
delays between gates in each instance of the PUF. The number of variations is large enough
that individual chips can be uniquely identified despite having identical designs and being
produced by an identical manufacturing process. Common designs include arbiter [99]
[101], ring oscillator [47], SRAM [53], butterfly [53], latch [154], and flip-flop [108].
• Arbiter PUF - This type of PUF compares the delay of what should be two identical
circuit paths. The paths compared are actually a multiplexer chain. The actual path
is determined by the input challenge. Each bit of the challenge is fed to multiplexer
inputs at each stage. The drawbacks to these types of PUFs are they can be susceptible to modeling attacks and difficulties in actual implementation. Since the routing
paths must be completely symmetric, mapping the design in an FPGA can result in
unbalanced paths.
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• Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF - The RO PUF is another delay based PUF. It compares
the number of oscillations in two ring oscillators. Each ring oscillator will have
differences in delays which will result in a different number of oscillations. Just like
with the arbiter PUF, the need for symmetric circuit layouts make it hard to map these
types of PUFs on FPGAs.
• SRAM PUF - The Static RAM (SRAM) PUF consists of a large number of memory
units which are a pair of cross coupled inverters. Intrinsic variations in the gates
result in each memory unit having a default value of 0 or 1 when power is first
supplied to it. The PUF response is constructed from these readings. SRAM PUFs
are not always suitable to FPGA mapping due to their need for a very specific layout
and hardware composition. Additionally, the use of volatile memory means power
must be supplied or else the response will be lost.
• Butterfly PUF - The butterfly PUF is an improved version of an SRAM PUF. It uses
latches instead of inverters in its memory units. This helps alleviate some of the
SRAM PUF concerns of being able to map it on FPGAs.
• Latch PUF - The latch PUF is another type of memory PUF. It uses cross coupled
NOR gates for its memory units. Its reliance on a specific type of logic gate makes it
difficult to map on FPGAs.
• Flip-flop PUF - The flip-flop PUF is a memory PUF that is specifically designed for
FPGA implementation. It uses flip-flops that are already present on an FPGA in the
same way that an SRAM PUF uses its memory units to generate a response.
Non-Silicon Based PUFs
Researchers have proposed designs that are based on much larger components such as
sensors, rather than transistor level designs. These designs are based on a wide range of
devices including microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) based sensors [178] [12], device touchscreens [143], photodiodes [139], and solar cells [10]. The MEMs designs [178]
[12] utilize a MEMs gyroscope to generate responses. The touchscreen based PUF [143]
requires a user to trace a specified pattern with their finger. The responses are built from
the variation in how different uses try to trace the same patter. The photodiode based PUF
[139] compares the voltage outputs of identical groupings of photodiodes. A conventional
PUF is used to determine which sensors are being compared to generate each response bit.
The solar cell work [10] shows that solar cells have intrinsic variations that could be used
as a PUF, but does not actually present a complete design. One proposed authentication
scheme [42] uses an optical PUF. This type of PUF involves firing a laser at a transparent film and recording the scattered speckles. Process variations will cause microscopic
differences in the films and result in unique speckle patterns for each film and therefore a
unique response for each copy of the PUF. Other researchers have proposed a PUF based
on radio frequency (RF) communication [25]. The design uses a deep neural network at the
receiver (Rx) to identify the unique properties of the signal’s transmitter (Tx). The unique
properties are a direct manifestation of process variations inherent to each transmitter.
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2.6.3

Relative Merits of PUF Designs

The major advantage sensor based PUFs have over silicon based ones becomes apparent
during their design process. These PUFs can be readily tested and modified since they
are made from existing components. The need to actually manufacture silicon based PUF
designs makes the creation of physical copies prohibitive in some cases. Those designs tend
to instead be simulated and tested using software rather than the actual physical device. The
downside to non-silicon PUF designs is the size of their components make them tend to be
much larger than silicon based PUF designs.

2.6.4

Use of PUF as a Security Measure

The inherent properties of uniqueness and unclonable of PUFs make them attractive for
use in security applications. For example, an attacker would be forced to obtain the actual
PUF itself if he or she wanted to use it in an attack as it would be impossible to create
an exact copy of the desired PUF. This is of course assuming the attacker would not be
able to somehow get a copy of a PUF’s response(s) from another device in the system.
Creating a clone of the PUF in that way is only made possible by a vulnerability in the
system that is completely unrelated to the PUF itself. Researchers have already proposed
various methods for integrating PUFs into standard security applications. Perhaps the most
obvious security applications of PUFs are the secure generation and storage of secret keys
[155] [45]. A PUF response by itself likely can’t be used as a secret key due to the reliability issues inherent in PUFs and the mathematical constraints placed on secret keys by their
respective cryptosystems. The reliability issues can be addressed by employing methods
such as error correcting codes (ECCs) that are designed to improve reliability [33] [175].
Furthermore, PUF responses can be used as a seed during the process of creating a secret
key. In standard cryptographic systems once a secret key is created it must then be stored
in secure memory to provide additional security from unauthorized access. Secure memory
has the disadvantage of being more expensive and slower to access than normal unsecure
memory. By using a PUF response to generate the secret key, the need to use secure memory is effectively removed. The reason for this is because the secret key never actually has
to be stored by the system. Instead, the PUF can generate the secret key every time it needs
to be used. The secret key is derived from the response of the PUF which means the only
data that will actually need to be stored is the challenge associated with the response used
to derive the desired the secret key. The origin of the challenge would be implementation
dependent. Some possible sources could be other nodes seeking to communicate, some
sort of central authority, or the challenge even could be hard coded into the device. Due to
the uniqueness of individual PUFs, a challenge by itself is essentially useless without also
having access to the PUF. For this reason, the challenge can be stored in simple unsecure
memory and as a result the secret key no longer requires the use of secure memory.
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2.7

Security Applications of PUFs

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have many potential uses in IoT and vehicular security. The unique attributes that are intrinsic to PUFs allow them to be used in ways that
would be otherwise impossible to implement using classical technology. This section will
describe just some of the existing approaches for applying to IoT security or vehicular security. It should be noted that even though the approaches in this section were explicitly
designed for use either in IoT devices or vehicles, there exists enough of a similarity between the two fields that only minimal effort would be required for some of the proposed
methods such as key storage to become applicable for both IoT applications and vehicular
applications.

2.7.1

IoT Applications

Use of PUF in Hardware Obfuscation
As previously mentioned, some researchers have explored using PUFs as a method for
obscuring the hardware of IoT devices to protect them from reverse engineering attacks.
One such approach is to use the response from the PUF to swap internal wiring within the
processing unit that is being protected [176]. A similar approach is the use the output of the
PUF to actually obscure the internal logic instead of the actual wiring [185]. In this design,
the original circuitry to be obscured is replaced with a PUF and some programmable fabric.
The input data to the original circuit servers as challenge to the PUF and the programmable
fabric is used as a PUF to allow the new circuit to function as originally intended.
PUF in FPGAs for IoT
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) with Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration (DPR)
capabilities can easibly be partially reconfigured. This makes them an attractive option for
IoT applications as these devices have the added flexibility of having a minimally invasive
method for updating the hardware. Unforunately, FPGAs that are DPR enabled can be
subjected to hardware trojan insertions [73]. Some researchers have proposed using PUFs
as way to fight against these attacks [72]. The researchers propose schemes that use the
challenge response pairs of PUFs in individual FPGAs to control the DPR functionality.
In the scheme a given FPGA creates a signature from challenges and responses and sends
it to an authority to validate its identity and request permission to enable or disable DPR.
By preventing and identifying unauthorized DPR usage, the device is able to protect itself
against hardware trojans that seek to exploit this vulnerability.

2.7.2

Vehicular Applications

PUF as a Secure Storage Method
Researchers in [45] have proposed using PUFs as a method for storing private keys for use
in vehicular communication. The typical methods of securely storing keys typically involve
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the use of secure memory. Their method allows for secure key storage in completely unsecured memory. This is achieved by having the keys be derived from the responses of a PUF.
The use of PUF ensures that an attacker would have to obtain the actual physical device in
order to extract the key. Another work proposed storage methods that involve using either
a strong PUF or a weak PUF [45]. For a strong PUF, multiple challenges and other helper
data required to ultimately derive the key is stored in normal unsecured memory. Whenever
a key is needed, the associated challenge is accessed and applied to the PUF. The desired
key is then derived from the PUF response. This storage method is shown in Figure 2.6.
For a weak PUF, only a single challenge and associated helper data is stored in unsecured
memory. The PUF response to that challenge is used to derive a “master seed”. That master
seed can then be used to further derive multiple keys. This type of storage method is shown
in Figure 2.7. In both scenarios, the security of the keys does not come from using secured
memory, but rather the fact that the keys can not be derived without access to the actual
PUF.

Figure 2.6: Strong PUF Key Storage Method from [45]

Figure 2.7: Weak PUF Key Storage Method from [45]

An alternative storage method has been proposed in [133]. In this method the PUF response itself is used to derive a pseudonym in the form of a public key and private key pair.
An overall Certificate Authority (CA) issues a certificate as proof that it has verified the validity of the generated pseudonym. This certificate can then be included in communications
with an external entity.
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Use of PUFs in Communication
Approaches have been proposed in the literature for integrating PUFs with vehicular communication systems. One such approach lays out a method in which an optical PUF could
be used as part of a non-forwardable authentication scheme for vehicle-to-vehicle communication [42]. Another approach is to incorporate a PUF into individual ECUs [156]. The
use of PUF allows for the creation of an authentication method for ECUs that are attached
to the CAN bus. A built-in authentication method makes it much harder for an attacker
to insert a malicious ECU into one of the communication networks on the vehicle. This
would help to eliminate the threat of an attacker attaching a malicious ECU to the network
that could then be used to send erroneous messages within the network.
PUF in Vehicle to Vehicle Communication
Researchers have proposed a way to use PUFs as part of a larger communication system
that is capable of avoiding adversary coalition attacks [42]. In a coalition attack, two or
more adversaries impersonate the sender and receiver by intercepting messages and then
forwarding them to their intended recipients. In the presented scenario [42], a given vehicle
is communicating with other nearby vehicles. The recipients of these communications are
authenticated using sensors to optically bind each communication with the correct vehicle.
Visually binding to other vehicles allows the vehicle to know the relative location of each
vehicle with which it is communicating. This knowledge of the exact location of nearby
vehicles can be leveraged to aid in the vehicle responding to warning messages from said
vehicles. By forwarding messages, adversaries can trick targeted vehicles into visually
binding a communication to the adversary intercepting and forwarding messages instead of
the actual intended recipient of the messages. Even if the adversaries in a coalition attack
simply forward the intercepted messages without any sort of tampering, the attacked vehicle can still misidentify an adversary as the vehicle with which it is communicating. This
could prove dangerous when attacked vehicles attempt to respond to warnings about emergency maneuvers such as emergency braking. The solution put forth by the researchers
for mitigating these sorts of attacks is to create a message authentication method that is
non-forwardable and therefore not susceptible to coalition attacks. Vehicles are assigned
certificates from a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) which contain physical characteristic
to aid in identifying the vehicle and challenge response pairs (CRPs). A vehicle wishing
to establish communication sends its certificate to a given vehicle. The receiving vehicle
extracts the information from the certificate. The receiving vehicle configures a laser to
the challenge parameters contained in the certificate. The receiving vehicle uses its laser
to stimulate the optical PUF on the sending vehicle and records the response. The receiving vehicle is able to authenticate the sending vehicle if the recorded response sufficiently
matches the response contained in the certificate. The receiving vehicle then sends its certificate to the sending vehicle and the process is repeated with swapped roles to allow the
sending vehicle to authenticate the receiving vehicle.
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Integration of PUFs and ECUs
Researchers in [156] present a way of preventing Denial of Service (DoS) attacks within
the CAN bus by implementing the ability to authenticate connected ECUs. The proposed
method is based on assigning an ID to each ECU connected to the CAN bus. Each of
the IDs are associated with specific challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of the PUFs that are
incorporated into each ECU. A centralized reference monitor (RM) securely stores copies
of the IDs and CRPs for each ECU within a trusted platform module (TPM). All of this
data is determined and loaded when the vehicle itself is being built. Any ECU wishing to
communicate along the CAN bus must first be authenticated by the RM. The authentication
process, in summary, is essentially any ECU that wants to communicate with another ECU
first sends the message to the RM along with its ID and a nonce, which is an arbitrarily chosen number that will only be used one time. The RM replies to the ECU with the challenge
associated with the given ID and temporarily stores the nonce for a later comparison. The
ECU receives the challenge from RM and computes its corresponding response. The ECU
then replies with the challenge response, ID, and a copy of the previously sent nonce. The
RM first compares the newly received nonce with the previously received nonce. The RM
waits a set amount of time for a response for a response containing a matching nonce. If
no response containing a message response is received during that time frame then the RM
drops the original message. Once the RM receives a reply with a matching nonce it then
determines if the challenge response is either a match or close enough to the stored challenge response associated with the ECU’s ID. An appropriate challenge response allows
the RM to determine the authenticity of the ECU and forward the ECU’s original message
to its intended destination. Challenge responses that are determined by the RM to not be
valid result in the RM deciding the ECU is illegitimate and suspending it.
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Chapter 3
Design of Piezo Sensor Based Physically
Unclonable Function
3.1

Introduction

PUFs are commonly designed at the transistor level which puts some special constraints
on the manufacture of each individual PUF. Those constraints are not present if the PUF
is instead manufactured from existing components. For our purposes those existing components should be ones that are already common in cyber-physical systems such as energy
harvesters and microcontrollers. There are multiple sources of energy (such as kinetic, solar
radiation, thermal energy, etc.) that could be targeted by energy harvesters in the embedded devices that would be found in IoT applications [172]. For the purposes of this chapter
we have chosen to focus on piezo sensors which use the piezoelectric effect to convert the
kinetic energy contained in vibrations and other motions into electricity. The integration
of this type of energy harvester has drawn interest in IoT [48] [152]. In this chapter we
propose a PUF design that is specifically targeted for use in cyber-physical systems. Our
proposed design is constructed from components that are common in IoT devices such as
microcontrollers and piezo sensors.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section II describes the methodology that was
used to design our proposed PUF; Section III explains the testing metrics of reliability
and uniformity and the results of those tests; Section IV compares our proposed design to
existing sensor based PUF designs; and lastly, Section V concludes the chapter. Material
from this chapter was previously published in [94] “C. Labrado and H. Thapliyal, Design
of a Piezoelectric-Based Physically Unclonable Function for IoT Security, IEEE Internet
of Things Journal © 2018 IEEE”

3.2

Design Methodology

In this section we will explain the design of our proposed PUF. The complete architecture of
the proposed PUF consists of a microcontroller, eight piezo sensors, eight 100 KΩ resistors,
and an AC voltage source. The proposed PUF should be considered a weak PUF as it is
designed to have only one possible challenge-response pair. There reason there should only
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be one pair is because the response generated by the PUF is a result of comparing intrinsic
characteristics of the piezo sensors. Because those intrinsic characteristics will not change,
comparisons of those characteristics and the response derived from them should not change
either. The response generation algorithm which will be described later in this section is
responsible for ensuring that it is only the intrinsic characteristics that are being compared.

3.2.1

Piezo Sensor

As described in [10], a piezo sensor can be modeled by the Butterworth-van-Dyke equivalent circuit shown in Figure 3.1. Capacitor C0 represents the electrical capacitance between
the piezo sensor leads. Capacitor C1 represents the mechanically equivalent capacitance inversely proportional to the stiffness of the piezo sensor. Inductor L represents the mechanically equivalent inductance proportional to the mass of the piezo sensor. Finally, Resistor
R represents the losses across the piezo sensor.
The presence of capacitors and inductors in the equivalent circuit guarantees that the
equivalent impedance of the piezo sensor can be varied by connecting an AC voltage source
to the leads of the sensor and and varying its frequency. In theory, multiple copies of the
same model of piezo sensor should have identical parameters each component in their
equivalent circuit. In actuality, the manufacturing process introduces slight variations into
individual sensors. These variations result in individual sensors having unique characteristics which manifest as the component values in the equivalent circuit. The uniqueness of
individual sensors can be utilized to create a PUF.

Figure 3.1: Piezo Sensor Butterworth-van-Dyke Equivalent Circuit (© 2018 IEEE)

3.2.2

Basic Piezo Circuit Diagram

The circuit shown in Figure 3.2 forms the basic building block of our proposed PUF. The
circuit consists of an AC voltage source VS , a piezo sensor, and a 100 KΩ resistor R placed
in series. The piezo sensors used were the cantiliver-type MiniSense 100 Vibration Sensor
from Measurement Specialties [149]. Assuming the peak amplitude of the input voltage
source remains constant, then the voltage VR across resistor R will be determined by the
impedance ZP iezo of the piezo sensor which in turn will be determined by the frequency of
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the voltage source. Across multiple copies of this circuit, even when they all have identical
input voltage sources, the voltage VR across resistor R will not actually be consistent. These
voltages will instead vary due to the previously described unique intrinsic characteristics of
each piezo sensor. These unique intrinsic characteristics will manifest as unique impedance
values of ZP iezo in each circuit and as a result VR will similarly be unique for each copy
of the circuit.

Figure 3.2: Piezo Measurement Circuit (© 2018 IEEE)

VR was measured by using the 12-bit analog-to-digital converter (ADC) built into a
EK-TM4C123GXL model Tiva LaunchPad. The use of a microcontroller allows for the
majority of the response generation process to be automated. The downside to using this
method is the ADC values can be noisy for singular readings. Additionally, an AC voltage
cannot be directly digitized by the ADC. In order to obtain consistent measurements, the
microcontroller samples the input voltage 10 times and determines what the peak reading
was for those samples. This peak detection process is performed 10,000 times. Those
10,000 values are then averaged together to determine an overall average peak voltage
value. By averaging so many values together, we are able to somewhat offset the noise
and therefore increase the reliability. The number of samples per run (10) and number of
runs (10,000) were experimentally determined for an input AC voltage of 300 KHz. The
number of samples each run must make is heavily dependent on the frequency of the input
voltage. As such, changes to only the sampling rate or the frequency of the input voltage
are likely to have a negative impact on the reliability of the system.

3.2.3

Complete Architecture

The size of the 12-bit ADC potentially limits how many bits long each response from the
PUF can be without introducing some form of padding such as feeding the 12-bit ADC
value into a hash function. The proposed design accounts for this by taking measurements
from eight instances of the circuit shown in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3 shows a fully constructed
PUF.
By default, the microcontroller has a base clock speed of 16 MHz and its ADC has a
maximum sampling rate of 125K samples per second. The default ADC sampling speed is
slower than the 300 KHz AC voltage driving our circuit. For our implementation we chose
to configure the microcontroller so that its clock speed was increased to 80 MHz and the
33

Figure 3.3: Complete PUF Circuit (© 2018 IEEE)

maximum sampling rate of the ADC was increased to 1M samples per second. The main
reason for the increases is the ADC is required to make a total of 100,000 samples per piezo
sensor and 800,000 overall to generate a single response. Increasing the rates reduces the
amount of time required to generate a response and also increases the accuracy when trying
to calculate the peak voltage of the AC voltage input.
Rather than simply taking the readings from each circuit and combining them to generate a response, the proposed system compares the sum voltages for banks of three sensors
and determines which one is larger. The result of the comparison is denoted by a single
bit. The uniqueness of the piezo sensors due to process variations should result in unique
voltage readings for each circuit. Creating summations of voltage readings for three different circuits greatly increases the number of possible unique comparison values. The
added benefit to comparing readings is it should effectively be a comparison of the intrinsic
characteristics that are unique to each circuit. Other factors such as the AC voltage source
will cancel out assuming they uniformly affect each circuit. A total of 128 comparisons are
made to generate the 128-bit response of the proposed PUF. Which sensors are compared
and in what order is predetermined and will be fully explained in the next section.

3.2.4

Response Bit Calculation Algorithm

As previously described, the PUF calculates an average peak voltage associated with each
piezo sensor. Three of those values are chosen, summed together, and then compared a
summation of three different values. The result of that comparison is represented by a
single response bit that is 1 if the first summation is larger, or 0 if it is not. This process is
repeated 127 more times to generate a complete 128-bit response. Each comparison must
be unique in terms of which groups of three are compared. This extends to preventing
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situations where the same groups are compared twice by reversing the comparison. For
example, seeing if sensors zero, one, and two are greater than three, four, and five before
later checking if sensors three, four, and five are greater than zero, one, and two. Each
instance of this would effectively reduce the size of the response by one bit because two
bits are complements of each other.
Additionally, special care must be given when choosing the combinations of circuits
that are being summed and compared to avoid biasing the result. Consider, as an example,
if the majority of the comparisons contained the third piezo sensor on the left hand side.
If the value associated with that sensor happened to be the largest of all of the voltage
values, then as a result the response bits should be biased towards 1. The values associated
with each piezo sensor should be used 48 times on each side of the comparison. This
was determined by multiplying the number of comparisons (128) by the number of values
summed on each side (3) before dividing by the total number of sensors (8).
Rather than create a single algorithm for generating 128 bits from balanced comparisons, it was determined that a shorter algorithm could be used to generate a subset of 8
bits that was still balanced. Invoking the algorithm 16 times would then result in a 128-bit
response that was not biased towards any single reading. Algorithm 1 shows the steps of
this algorithm.
Algorithm 1 PUF 8-bit Response Comparison Balancing Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:

9:

10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:

procedure BALANCE(bits, place, v[ ], l[ ], r[ ])
bits ← Array containing response bits
place ← Current response bit to be generated
v[ ] ← Array of each circuit0 s peak voltage
l[ ] ← Array of 3 circuits to be summed
r[ ] ← Array of 3 circuits to be summed
for i = 0; i < 8; i = i + 1 do {
lsum = v[(i + l[0]) mod 8]
+v[(i + l[1]) mod 8]
+v[(i + l[2]) mod 8]
rsum = v[(i + r[0]) mod 8]
+v[(i + r[1]) mod 8]
+v[(i + r[2]) mod 8]
if lsum > rsum then
bits[place] = 1
else
bits[place] = 0
place=place+1
}
return

Algorithm 1 assumes that all 128 of the response bits are contained in an array bits. It
will generate 8 response bits beginning at the location denoted by place. Array v contains
the 8 peak voltage values associated with each piezo sensor (piezo sensor 0 is in location
0, sensor 1 is in location 1, etc.). Arrays l and r each denote the three piezo sensors whose
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associated values are to be summed together to make the first comparison. The generated
response bit will be 1 if the sum of the values associated with l is greater than the sum of
the values associated with r. Otherwise, the response bit will be 0. The value of place
is incremented by 1 after each bit is generated to keep track of which bit of the overall
128-bit response will be generated next. The determination of which sensors to use in each
subsequent comparison occurs by incrementing each sensor by 1 and then rolling back to
0 if the result would have been 8. The process completes after 8 total comparisons have
been made and as a result 8 response bits have been generated. This algorithm guarantees
that the value associated with each piezo sensor will be used 3 times on each side of the
comparison.
As previously mentioned, Algorithm 1 must be fed a series of 16 inputs in order to
generate an entire 128-bit response. Each of these inputs must be chosen so that invoking
Algorithm 1 does not inadvertently result in multiple instances of the same comparison.
Algorithm 2 shows a list of input values lef t and right for the arrays l[] and r[], respectively, in Algorithm 1 that can be used to generate a 128-bit response without using the
same comparison to generate multiple response bits.
Algorithm 2 Input Values to Balancing Algorithm
1: left: 0, 1, 2 right: 3, 4, 5
2: left: 0, 1, 3 right: 2, 4, 5
3: left: 0, 1, 4 right: 2, 3, 5
4: left: 0, 1, 5 right: 2, 3, 4
5: left: 0, 1, 6 right: 2, 3, 4
6: left: 0, 1, 7 right: 2, 3, 4
7: left: 0, 2, 3 right: 1, 4, 5
8: left: 0, 2, 4 right: 1, 3, 5
9: left: 0, 2, 5 right: 1, 3, 4
10: left: 0, 2, 6 right: 1, 3, 4
11: left: 0, 2, 7 right: 1, 3, 4
12: left: 0, 3, 4 right: 1, 2, 5
13: left: 0, 3, 5 right: 1, 2, 6
14: left: 0, 3, 6 right: 1, 2, 7
15: left: 0, 3, 7 right: 1, 2, 4
16: left: 0, 4, 5 right: 1, 2, 3
The end result of invoking Algorithm 1 with the inputs shown in Algorithm 2 is a 128bit response with improved uniformity due to the lack of bias towards any single piezo
sensor. The values associated with each piezo sensor are used an equal number of times in
both summations on either side of of the comparison on line 10 of Algorithm 1. During the
generation of a 128-bit response, the peak voltage associated with each piezo sensor will
be used a total of 96 times (48 times on each side of the comparison).
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3.3

Testing Configuration and Results

The physically unclonable function (PUF) proposed in this chapter was evaluated in terms
of its reliability and uniformity as described in [110]. For testing, we created three copies
of the proposed PUF. The average reliability and average uniformity was evaluated individually for each PUF and overall as a whole.
We did not evaluate our proposed PUF in terms of uniqueness, which serves as an
indicator of how well an individual PUF can be distinguished from other copies of the
PUF. We feel that our small sample size of three would prevent any uniqueness values from
being truly meaningful. By comparison, uniqueness testing performed in existing literature
can make use of simulated PUF copies to perform uniqueness testing for sample sizes that
are orders of magnitude larger than ours.

3.3.1

Reliability Testing

We evaluated the reliability of our proposed PUF by recording the responses of each copy
of the PUF over a period of 10 days. We used the Day 1 response as the reference response
that all subsequent responses were compared to. Figure 3.4 shows a graph of the reliability
values for each copy of the PUF. The worst case reliability for each PUF was observed to be
89.8%, 92.2%, and 98.4%. Table 3.1 contains the average reliability values for each copy
of the PUF. The overall average reliability was determined to be 96.1%. Ideally, each copy
of the PUF would have 100% reliability for each day. This was not the case for out tested
PUFs. PUF3 was the PUF that came closest to having optimal reliability. The differences
in results for each copy of the PUFs is purely random. They are a manifestation of the
intrinsic variations within the piezo sensors that allow for them to be used to create the
PUF in the first place. Each copy of the PUF is otherwise identical.
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Figure 3.4: Reliability Graph (© 2018 IEEE)

Additionally, the reliability of a chosen PUF was tested across a range of temperatures
from -20°C to 0°C and from 25°C to 80°C in increments of 5°C. 25°C was chosen as the
reference point since it is room temperature. A freezer was used to generate temperatures
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Table 3.1: Average Reliability of Proposed PUF (© 2018 IEEE)
PUF1
91.84%

PUF2
96.53%

PUF3
99.83 %

Total
96.07 %

from -20°C to 0°C and a temperature chamber was used for 25°C to 80°C. Due to limitations in the facilities available to us, we were not able to test over the range between 0°C
and 25°C. Figure 3.5 shows the reliability graph with respect to temperature. The red line
running between 0°C and 25°C is an interpolation between our measured values.
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Figure 3.5: Temperature Reliability Graph. The red line on the graph represents an extrapolation of the reliability values between 0°C and 25°C (© 2018 IEEE)

The graph in Figure 3.5 shows that the reliability values decrease as the temperature
move away from room temperature (25°C). The reliability still remains fairly consistent as
the temperature rises above 25°C. Conversely, there is a drop at subzero temperatures that
first appears to rise as the temperature continues to decrease from 0°C. The reliability then
drops from -15°C to -20°C. This is likely just randomness of the PUF itself as its overall
trend of the reliability decreasing as the temperature deviates from room temperature is
typical of PUFs.

3.3.2

Uniformity Testing

Uniformity can vary between each instance of a PUF due to intrinsic variations that are
present despite each copy of the PUF being otherwise identical. For that reason we averaged the uniformity values of the responses from each PUF to obtain an idea of the general
uniformity that can be expected from the proposed PUF. Table 3.2 shows the average uniformity for each of the proposed PUFs. The average uniformity for the individual PUFs
38

were calculated by calculating and then averaging the uniformity of each response from the
10 day period previously used for the reliability calculations. The average uniformity of
our PUF implementations was 47.52%.
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Figure 3.6: Uniformity Graph (© 2018 IEEE)

Table 3.2: Average Uniformity of Proposed PUF (© 2018 IEEE)
PUF1
46.72%

3.4

PUF2
47.19%

PUF3
47.81 %

Total
47.24 %

Comparison to Existing Designs

Using sensors as the basis for the design of our proposed PUF makes it somewhat difficult
to compare to existing designs. During our research of existing literature, we found that
works which described PUF designs that were not silicon based did not typically provide
performance metrics like we provided in the previous section. For this reason, we are not
able to make direct comparisons to other PUFs that are based on sensors. Instead, we can
only highlight the functional advantages of our proposed design.
As previously mentioned in this chapter, PUF designs have been proposed which are
based on a range of devices including microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) based
sensors [178] [12], device touchscreens [143], photodiodes [139], and solar cells [10]. The
MEMs designs [178] [12] utilize a MEMs gyroscope to generate responses. This raises
questions about how easily a given orientation of the gyroscope can be reproduced. A
similar problem arises with the touchscreen based PUF [143]. It requires a user to trace
a specified pattern with their finger. Even with it being a set pattern, error should still be
introduced by a human trying to replicate fine motions used to trace the pattern. The issue
with the proposed photodiode based PUF [139] is it actually requires a conventional PUF
as part of its design. Lastly, the solar cell work [10] is not as fully formed as the other
designs. It shows that solar cells have intrinsic variations that could be used as a PUF, but
does not present a complete design. This information is summarized in Table 3.3.
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Our proposed design does not have any of these issues. Challenges can be easily reproduced for any copy of the PUF as the pattern of comparisons made are purely software
based. In addition, our proposed design does not require an existing conventional PUF
for proper operation. Currently, the downside to our proposed design is a sinusoidal input
voltage is needed to really observe the unique properties of individual piezo sensors.
Table 3.3: PUF Comparison (© 2018 IEEE)
PUF
MEMs [178] [12]

Touchscreen [143]

Photodiode [139]

Solarcells [10]

Proposed Design

3.5

Description
The response of a gyroscope is used to derive the
PUF responses
Mobile device app requires
a user to trace a set pattern
with their finger
Summed voltages of two
groups of photodiodes are
compared to generate response bits
Solar cells generate a
unique response based on
input light intensity and
ambient temperature
Uses a microcontroller to
compare voltage readings
across banks of piezo sensors

Drawback
Concerns over the reproducibility of the challenge.
Concerns over the reproducibility of the challenge.
Requires a conventional
PUF to operate.

Not yet a fully formed
PUF.

Requires a sinusoidal input
source.

Conclusions

In conclusion, we have proposed a method for using piezo sensors to create a physically unclonable function (PUF). The results of our initial rounds of testing are encouraging enough
to indicate that our proposed method is viable way to create PUFs. The use of a microcontroller and energy harvesting devices further establishes the possibility of incorporating the
proposed PUF into IoT devices or vehicles as a cybersecurity solution.
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Chapter 4
Use of Thermistor Temperature Sensors
for Cyber-Physical System Security
4.1

Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated how piezo sensors have been used to create a weak
PUF design. However, the use of piezo sensors required including an AC voltage source
in the design which further harms its utility. One potential solution to this issue is to
explore creating a PUF from another component that is commonly found in cyber-physical
systems. An example is thermistor temperature sensors. Thermistors have widespread
appeal as shown by the presence of temperature sensing capabilities in a wide range of
fields including health care [88], agriculture [116], and smart home environments [105]. In
this chapter we propose a methodology that allows for using thermistor temperature sensors
to create a PUF that is specifically targeted for application in cyber-physical systems. Our
proposed design uses a microcontroller and thermistors which are themselves commonly
used by these types of devices.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 covers PUFs including security applications and design approaches that are relevant to our proposed design; Section
4.3 describes the design methodology behind our proposed PUF; Section 4.4 describes the
tests used to evaluate our proposed PUF and presents the results of those tests; Section 4.5
compares our proposed PUF to existing sensor-based PUF designs; and finally, Section 4.6
concludes the chapter by providing a summary of our results. We evaluated the viability
of using thermistors as a basis for creating a PUF by testing copies of the proposed design in terms of reliability and uniformity and used Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate
the uniqueness. We provide the following:
• Proposal of a PUF circuit design methodology based on intrinsic variations between
thermistors.
• Testing the proposed PUF’s reliability over 1000 consecutive readings.
• Testing the proposed PUF’s uniformity over 1000 consecutive readings.
• Testing the proposed PUF’s reliability over a temperature range of −20 °C to 80 °C.
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• Testing the proposed PUF’s reliability over a relative humidity range of 30% to 100%
• Calculating the proposed PUF’s uniqueness through Monte Carlo simulations on
1000 simulated instances.
The information in this chapter was previously published in [98].

4.2

Background and Related Work

This section provides information on PUFs including different design approaches and examples of their usage in security applications.

4.2.1

Physically Unclonable Functions

PUFs are a type of device that are commonly used in security applications. PUFs take a
given “challenge” or input and use it to produce an associated “response” or output. A challenge and its associated response are collectively referred to as a challenge-response pair
(CRP). PUFs are especially designed in a way that make them impossible to clone, hence
the name “physically uncloneable”. PUF operations rely on their own intrinsic variations
that are commonly introduced during the manufacturing process. These variations are random and result in each instance of a given PUF with unique CRPs.
Additionally, PUFs can be characterized as either “weak” or “strong”. Weak PUFs
are characterized as having a very limited number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs),
typically just one. They are used in applications where attackers are assumed to not be
able to access the responses as knowing just one CRP could be enough to compromise it.
Conversely, strong PUFs have a very large number of CRPs. This allows them to be used
in applications where an attacker could obtain access to some of the CRPs. This is because
strong PUFs should have enough possible challenges that an attacker will not be able to
determine all possible CRPs if given a subset of CRPs.

4.2.2

Use of PUF as a Security Measure

The intrinsic properties of PUFs make them well suited to a variety of security applications.
Each instance of a PUF should be both unique and unclonable. This places an extra hurdle
in the way of attackers that forces them to obtain the actual PUF that is being targeted in the
attack as it should be impossible for them to create an exact copy of the PUF. Researchers
have begun proposing a wide range of security measures that seek to directly leverage the
unique features of PUFs.
One major focus of research has been using PUFs as a way of securely generating and
storing secret keys [45, 155]. The response from a PUF is used as a seed to generate secret
keys. For weak PUFs, the response is a master seed from which all generated secret keys
are ultimately derived. The downside to this approach is an attacker only must compromise
a single CRP or potentially even one of the keys to compromise all the keys generated by
the PUF. Using a strong PUF instead provides more security as each key is derived from a
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different CRP. The CRPs of strong PUFs are unpredictable and therefore even if an attacker
compromises some of the CRPs or keys it has generated, the rest are virtually unaffected.
An approach similar to the one used in key generation can be applied to remove the
need for secure memory to store secret keys [45]. Compared to normal unsecure memory,
secure memory has the downside of having slower access speeds and being more expensive.
As previously described, secret keys can be derived from PUF responses. Rather than store
the keys in memory, they can instead be regenerated each time they are needed. This means
that the only information that must be stored for each key is the challenge and whatever
associated helper data required to generate it. This information is useless to an attacker that
does not have access to the actual PUF and thus can be stored in normal unsecure memory.

4.2.3

PUF Design Methodologies

Silicon has proven to be a very popular medium for designing PUFs as researchers are able
create designs based on transistor-level variations such as the propagation delay between
gates [47] or the initial values found in memory when first powered on [141]. For selfcontained devices such as IoT nodes, the implementation of these Silicon-based PUFs, especially ones based on propagation delay, would likely require the addition of specialized
hardware or only be viable in certain applications. For example, the sensor node security
protocol proposed in [11] uses a memory-based PUF created from the Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) found in commercial Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) modules. Other
researchers have begun exploring the feasibility of implementing a Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)-based PUF in the existing memory of a Raspberry Pi B+ [29].
In addition to Silicon, there exists a wide range of components and materials which are
suitable for PUF design [109]. The designs of Non-Silicon-based PUFs prove to be much
more varied than normal silicon-based designs. Of particular interest are sensor-based
PUFs as they are the category of PUF that our proposed design fits into. Comparatively
little research exists on sensor-based PUFs. However, sensors and similar sorts of measurement devices are especially attractive for designing PUFs since their core functionality
of measuring and reporting values can be directly incorporated into a PUF. Sensor PUF
designs have been proposed based on a large range of components including microelectromechanical systems (MEMS)-based sensors [12, 159, 178], device touchscreens [143],
photodiodes [139], solar cells [10], and piezoelectric sensors [94]. More information about
these designs will be presented in Section V. For further information about other PUF
designs, a number of existing comprehensive literature surveys are available. We point
interested readers to any one of the following works: [46, 58, 190].

4.3

Proposed Design of Thermistor Temperature SensorBased PUF

A thermistor is a temperature sensing device whose resistance changes with temperature.
The design of our proposed PUF uses the on the fact that variations introduced during the
manufacturing process will cause individual thermistors to have different resistances at a
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given temperature. These variations are what allow us to ultimately design a PUF capable
of generating unique outputs.
In our proposed design we did not include the implementation of error correcting codes.
Error correcting codes have already been proposed as a way to improve the reliability of
responses by addressing faults such as bit-flip errors [26, 33, 40]. However, we wish to
evaluate the baseline reliability of our proposed design. Adding error correction codes
would obscure these values since the actual results would have been influenced by the
codes. The addition of error correcting codes are thus a more relevant consideration for
future work that would involve creating a production quality PUF from the proof of concept
represented in this chapter.

4.3.1

Basic Circuit Diagram

The EK-TM4C123GXL model Tiva LaunchPad microcontroller we are using does not have
a direct way to measure resistance. Instead, the board has a 12-bit analog-to-digital converter (ADC) capable of detecting voltages between 0 V and 3.3 V. For that reason we
needed to create a circuit that would allow the changes in a given thermistor temperature
sensor’s resistance to manifest as voltage drops.
Our proposed solution is shown in Figure 4.1. The thermistors used in our design were
NXP KTY81/220. Their operating parameters are shown in Table 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Proposed PUF Circuit Diagram (previously published in [98])
Table 4.1: Operating Parameters of NXP KRY81/220 Temperature Sensors [144] (previously published in [98])
Parameter

Value

Operating Temperature
−55°C to 150 °C
Typical Resistance @ −20 °C
1367 Ω
Typical Resistance @ 25 °C
2000 Ω
Typical Resistance @ 80 °C
2980 Ω
The entire circuit consists of 8 thermistor temperature sensors (here represented as resistors R) placed in series with a 3.3 V input voltage supplied by the microcontroller. A point
before each thermistor is attached to an ADC input pin (Ain ). The microcontroller is then
able to take a voltage reading at each point and determine the voltage VR across each thermistor R by finding the different between two surrounding points. For example, the voltage
across thermistor R5 would be equal to the difference in readings between ADC inputs Ain5
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and Ain4 . The following equations show all the calculations that are made to determine the
voltage across each thermistor:
VR7
VR6
VR5
VR4
VR3
VR2
VR1
VR0

= Ain7 − Ain6
= Ain6 − Ain5
= Ain5 − Ain4
= Ain4 − Ain3
= Ain3 − Ain2
= Ain2 − Ain1
= Ain1 − Ain0
= Ain0

(4.1)

Additionally, singular values read by the ADC can be noisy and slightly vary between
readings. As a countermeasure, the final value for each ADC reading is actually the result
of taking 100,000 readings and averaging the results.

4.3.2

Complete Architecture

Our proposed design requires 8 thermistor temperature sensors. Each sensor is connected
to a microcontroller in the configuration shown in Figure 4.1. The onboard ADC is used
to sample the voltage readings at each point and uses that data to ultimately derive a voltage drop across each thermistor. After this step is completed, an algorithm can be used to
process the individual voltage data and construct a 128-bit response. One such example
algorithm can be found in [94]. That algorithm generates a response by making a series
of comparisons between total output readings for predetermined groups of a given component. That algorithm assumes that each component should have the same reading, and any
differences are solely due to their intrinsic variations. This means that actions such as applying heat to some of the thermistors will result in unreliable readings. The end result is
a PUF design that is directly based on thermistor temperature sensors. Figure 4.2 shows a
picture of the fully constructed PUF.

Figure 4.2: Prototype Implementation of Proposed Thermistor Based PUF
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4.4

Testing Configuration and Results

The responses generated from our proposed PUF design were tested to evaluate their reliability and uniformity (as originally described in [110]). In addition, we evaluated the
uniqueness of the design by performing Monte Carlo simulations with 1000 simulated
copies of the PUF.

4.4.1

Reliability Testing

The reliability of a PUF is a measure of how often it will produce the correct response.
The ideal reliability value of a PUF is 100%. This indicates that the PUF will never produce an erroneous response to a given challenge. The following equation (first described
in [110]) is used to calculate the reliability for a n-bit response:
m

0

1 X HD(Ri , Ri,t )
× 100%
Reliability = 100% −
m t=1
n

(4.2)
0

In this equation, Ri is a chosen reference response from PUF instance i. Ri is a response generated under different environmental conditions. A total of m responses are
0
collected with different environmental conditions. HD(Ri , Ri,t ) is the hamming distance
0
(HD) between the reference response (Ri ) and the t-th generated response (Ri,t ).
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Figure 4.3: Reliability of PUFs Against Repeated Response Generation (previously published in [98])
For our initial reliability testing we took 1000 consecutive readings from 5 copies of
our proposed PUF. The first response generated by each PUF was used as the reference
response. All readings were taken in a lab space under normal room conditions. Figure 4.3 shows the graphs for the reliability values of the responses generated by each PUF.
The graphs show that each PUF copy maintains a level of reliability that remains close to
the ideal value of 100%. Table 4.2 contains the average reliability values for each copy
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of the PUF. Among the five copies of the proposed PUF, PUF2 had the highest average
reliability at 99.16% while PUF1 had the lowest at 97.09%. The overall combined average
reliability for the tested copies was 98.46%.
Table 4.2: Average Reliability Values of Proposed PUF Instances when Generating 1000
Consecutive Responses (previously published in [98])
PUF1

PUF2

PUF3

PUF4

PUF5

Total

97.09%

99.16%

99.09%

98.08%

98.91%

98.46%

Temperature Reliability Testing
The next phase of reliability testing involved taking readings on each PUF over a range
of −20 °C to 80 °C in increments of 5 °C. This was achieved by using the temperature
chamber shown in Figure 4.4 and the graph of the results is shown in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.4: Testing Chamber (previously published in [98])
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Figure 4.5: Reliability with Respect to Temperature. 25 °C was used as the reference value
and the measured range was −20 °C to 80 °C in increments of 5 °C (previously published
in [98])
25 °C was used as the reference temperature for determining the reliability values.
This is why each copy of the PUF shows 100% reliability at 25 °C. The graph shows that
the reliability values begin to fall off as the temperature moves away from the reference
temperature of 25 °C. It is worth noting that PUF1 had a more pronounced decline than the
other copies of the PUF did as the temperature moved towards −20°. This could be due
to just random chance as the other 4 copies of the PUF remain relatively close together.
In addition, PUF1 does not suffer a similarly drastic fall in reliability compared to the
other copies of the PUF as the temperature approaches 80°. Even though PUF1’s average
reliability was a relatively respectable 92.97%, it was still the lowest average reliability
among the tested PUFs. Table 4.3 shows the average reliability for each copy of the PUF.
The overall total average reliability for the set was 95.49%.
Table 4.3: Average Reliability from −20 °C to 80 °C (previously published in [98])
PUF1

PUF2

PUF3

PUF4

PUF5

Total

92.97%

96.32%

96.84%

96.21%

95.09%

95.49%

Relative Humidity Reliability Testing
Reliability testing was also performed with respect to relative humidity. 30% relative humidity was used as the reference values and the relative humidity increased from 30% to
100% in increments of 10%. Figure 4.6 shows the reliability of the PUFs as the relative humidity increases from 30%. Overall, the PUFs seemed to be resistant to changes in relative
humidity. Most copies did not show consistent drops in reliability until the relative humidity reached 80%. Table 4.4 shows the average reliability for each copy of the PUF. PUF1
once again demonstrated the lowest reliability of the test group with an average reliability
of 95.70%. The overall total average reliability was 98.30%.
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Figure 4.6: Reliability with Respect to Relative Humidity. 30% was used as the reference
value and the measured range was 30% to 100% (previously published in [98])
Table 4.4: Average Reliability from 30% to 100% Relative Humidity (previously published
in [98])

4.4.2

PUF1

PUF2

PUF3

PUF4

PUF5

Total

95.70%

99.12%

99.12%

98.05%

99.51%

98.30%

Uniformity Testing

The uniformity of a PUF describes how “balanced” its responses are, i.e., what is the prevalence of 1’s vs. 0’s in the bits of the responses. Ideally, there will be an equal number of 1’s
and 0’s to maximize the difficulty for an attacker trying to guess the value of a given bit.
This ideal scenario is represented by a uniformity value of 50%. The following equation
(first described in [110]) is used to calculate the uniformity of a n-bit response:
n

1X
U nif ormity =
ri,l × 100%
n l=1

(4.3)

In the above equation, ri,l represents the l-th bit of a n-bit long response generated by
PUF instance i. In order to obtain a general uniformity of PUF we averaged together all the
readings for a given test. Table 4.5 shows the average uniformity value for each copy of the
proposed PUF across each of the areas of testing (1000 consecutive responses, temperature,
and humidity). The overall average uniformity values for the different tests were 50.22%,
49.34%, and 47.91%, respectively. On average, the uniformity values were very close to
the ideal value of 50%.
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Table 4.5: Average Uniformity Values of Proposed PUF Instances (previously published in
[98])
PUF1

PUF2

PUF3

PUF4

PUF5

Total

Consecutive 49.66% 49.96% 50.05% 49.48% 51.94% 50.22%
Temperature 48.59% 48.21% 49.52% 48.92% 51.45% 49.34%
Humidity
47.46% 46.58% 49.51% 47.85% 48.14% 47.91%

4.4.3

Uniqueness Testing

As described in [110], the uniqueness of a PUF represents the ability to distinguish one
particular instance of a PUF from a group of PUFs of the same type. The ideal uniqueness
value is 50%. The following equation is used to calculate uniqueness:
k−1 X
k
X
2
HD(Ri , Rj )
× 100%
U niqueness =
k(k − 1) i=1 j=i+1
n

(4.4)

The above equation determines the average hamming distance (HD) among k total
PUFs. Ri and Rj represent n-bit responses produced by PUFs i and j, respectively where
i 6= j.
The common method for evaluating the uniqueness property of a PUF is by performing
Monte Carlo simulations as this allows many unique copies to be generated. For our simulations we created 1000 simulated copies of the PUF. We first created a normal distribution
of resistors using the manufacturer specified resistances at 25 °C [144]: minimum of 1960
Ω, maximum of 2040 Ω, and typical of 2000 Ω. Each simulated instance was created by
randomly choosing 8 resistors from the distribution. The uniqueness was determined to be
49.89%.

4.5

Comparison to Existing Designs

It should be noted that other PUF designs which are effectively based on measuring differences in resistance values have been proposed. Those designs are based on materials
such as magnetoresistive RAM (MRAM)[37], memristors [138, 166], and on-chip transistors [76] and metal wires [75, 76]. These designs share a common theme with our proposed
thermistor PUF of using unique resistances to produce a response. However, we do not feel
this is strong enough of a justification to include these designs in direct comparisons that
we will do with other sensor PUF designs. The main reason is that one of the goals in creating sensor PUFs is that theoretically a device that already contains the requisite number
of sensors could function as a PUF without needing to add any additional hardware. Much
like Silicon PUFs, these resistance-measuring PUFs would have to be specifically added
to the target device. Furthermore, the resistances of thermistors are designed to change
with temperature and can therefore be more sensitive than the components in other designs. Variations in physical properties due to temperature are not intended to be the core
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operating mechanic of those designs (e.g., allowing thermistors to measure temperature).
Sensors on the other hand are generally designed to change one of their physical properties
in a significant and predictable way as a direct response to the environmental condition they
are monitoring. That same physical property also serves as the basis for creating a sensor
PUF from a given sensor. It is for these reasons the focus of our comparisons will be PUF
designs that are based on sensors.
Certain difficulties were encountered when attempting to compare the results of our
proposed thermistor PUF to existing sensor PUF designs. Unfortunately, sensor PUFs are
less popular than Silicon-based PUFs and thus there is comparatively little directly applicable existing research for which we can compare our work. This is further exacerbated by the
fact that works that have proposed sensor-based designs do not tend to include performance
metrics that can be directly compared with our results. Among the existing sensor-based
PUF designs, we are only able to make a direct comparison of performance metrics with
the piezo sensor-based design [94]. Comparisons to other designs will solely focus on the
functional aspects of the PUF designs.
The devices that we will specifically highlight are microelectromechanical systems
(MEMs)-based sensors [12, 159, 178], device touchscreens [143], photodiodes [139], solar
cells [10], and piezo sensors [94]. These designs have certain drawbacks that could hinder
their adoption by cyber-physical systems. The piezo sensor PUF [94] requires a sinusoidal
input source which is not always readily available certain devices. Additionally, piezo sensors cannot be considered to be prevalent as thermistor temperature sensors since vibration
sensing is less common when compared to temperature sensing. The MEMs gyroscope
designs [12, 178] generate responses based on the output of a MEMs gyroscope. The major concern would be how easily a given gyroscope orientation could be reproduced by a
user. A different MEMs-based approach is a ring oscillator (RO) PUF design in which the
ring oscillators are constructed from pressure sensing MEMs relays [159]. This design is
costly as it requires a separate RO for each bit in the response in addition to bias generation
circuitry to control the relays. The touchscreen design [143] is subject to the same type
of concern. The design generates a response based on a user’s ability to trace a specified
pattern on the screen. There should be a certain amount of variance in results every time
a user attempts to replicate the same fine movements that would be used to trace a specified pattern. The photodiode-based design [139] is subject to a sort of chicken and egg
problem where its design actually requires a conventional PUF to operate. Lastly, the solar
cell work [10] shows that solar cells could potentially be used as a PUF, but stops short of
proposing a complete design. Table 4.6 contains a summary of the drawbacks of various
sensor PUF designs.
Our proposed design does not suffer from any of the previously mentioned drawbacks
that are present in existing designs. One potential concern is the number of thermistors
required to implement our proposed design will not always be present in a given cyberphysical device or system. However, some areas such as certain industrial applications [50,
71] which make use of redundant temperature sensors could be especially suitable thanks
to the larger than normal number of temperature sensors.
In terms of actual performance metrics, we were only able to make direct comparisons
with the reliability and uniformity results between our proposed design and those from the
piezo sensor-based PUF [94]. Uniqueness values were not reported. Table 4.7 contains
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these values for both our proposed design and the previous piezo sensor work. The average
reliability and uniformity across three copies of the piezo PUF was calculated to be 96.07%
and 47.24%, respectively. Our proposed design had an average reliability of 98.46% and
an average uniformity of 50.22%.
This improvement could be attributed to a couple of factors. The first possibility is
the circuit used by our proposed PUF could be more conducive to producing consistent
responses. The piezo design required using an ADC to sample AC waveforms which could
introduce noise into the measurements. The fact that our proposed design samples what
should be steady DC voltages means that the overall sampling process is more straightforward and thus more consistent. A second possible contributing factor is some unspecified
aspect of the physical properties of thermistor temperature sensors could simply make them
better suited than piezo sensors for constructing PUFs.
Table 4.6: PUF Comparison (previously published in [98])
PUF

Description

Drawback

Piezo [94]

Compares
summations
of voltage drops across
groups of piezo sensors

Requires an additional AC
input voltage.
Limited
applications compared to
proposed design.

MEMs Gyro [12, 178]

Responses are derived
from the output of a
MEMs gyroscope

Concerns about being able
to repeatedly produce a desired CRP.

MEMs Pressure [159]

Ring Oscillator (RO) design using pressure sensitive MEMs relays.

Significant overhead due to
additional circuitry.

Touchscreen [143]

A user traces a specified
pattern displayed on the
touchscreen

Concerns about being able
to repeatedly produce a desired CRP.

Photodiode [139]

Compares summation of
sensor groups based on the
output of a PUF

Correct operation requires
an existing conventional
PUF.

Solar Cells [10]

Testing results show that Complete design not prosolar cells produce unique posed.
voltages for the same light
source

Proposed Design

Uses microcontroller to
compare readings from
groups
of
thermistor
temperature sensors to
generate a weak response.
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Requires more thermistor
temperature sensors than
may already exist in certain systems.

Table 4.7: PUF Comparison (previously published in [98])

Uniformity
Reliability

Piezo [94]

Proposed

47.24%
96.07%

50.22%
98.46%

A direct comparison of reliability with respect to temperature is complicated by the
testing method employed for the piezo PUF. Both our proposed PUF and the piezo PUF
used 25 °C as a reference temperature. However, two different chambers were used to test
ranges of −20 °C to 0 °C and 25 °C and 80 °C with the range of 0 °C to 25 °C being extrapolated. This prevents a direct comparison in terms of average reliability values. What can
be noted is the reliability for the piezo PUF faces a much sharper drop in reliability (below
roughly 88%) than any of the thermistor PUFs in which the lowest recorded reliability was
92.97% at 80 °C for PUF1. Additionally, for the range of −20 °C to 0 °C the piezo PUF
had its reliability generally drop as the temperature approached 0 °C. Its reliability at −20
°C was better than all the tested copies of our proposed thermistor temperature sensor PUF.
However, its reliability at 0 °C was worse than any of the copies of our proposed thermistor
temperature sensor PUF.

4.6

Discussion & Conclusions

In this chapter, we have proposed a novel PUF design for use in cyber-physical systems by
using thermistors which are components commonly found within the field. The actual design uses a microcontroller to compare the summed voltage outputs across predetermined
groups of thermistor temperature sensors to generate a weak response. Monte Carlo simulations produced a uniqueness value of 49.89% which is very close to the ideal value of 50%.
Our proposed design was shown to have improved overall reliability and with regards to
changes in temperature when compared to the existing design based on piezo sensors [94].
Additional reliability testing with respect to relative humidity appeared to show that the
proposed design is relatively unaffected by humidity values less than 80%. As a future
work, the addition of error correcting codes could help improve the reliability values of the
base design.
It is worth noting that this design should be treated as a proof of concept and not a fully
realized security solution. The main goal in creating this device was to conduct a preliminary exploration to determine if thermistor temperature sensors are a viable option for PUF
creation when compared to existing sensor-based PUF designs. The prototypes we created
for testing purposes were meant to only address this question of viability. The prototypes
are vulnerable to physical attacks such as an attacker manually measuring the voltage drops
across each thermistor and then creating a model of the PUF. Other researchers have already explored mitigation methods such as implementing tamper-resistance [64, 103] and
providing protection from side channel attacks [77, 127, 158]. Exploring the integration
of existing solutions or devising new concepts are outside of the scope of this chapter and
should instead be considered to be avenues for future work when designing a full-scale
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production quality implementation.
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Chapter 5
Exploration of Solar Cell Materials for
Developing Novel Physically Unclonable
Functions in Cyber-Physical Systems
Energy-efficiency is a major concern of the Internet of Things (IoT) devices found within
cyber-physical systems. Solar cells are one common option for providing a source of power
to these devices. A PUF designed using solar cells has the potential to not only serve as a
source of power generation, but also provide security. In this chapter, we propose a novel
PUF architecture based on solar cells. The proposed design utilizes a microcontroller to
read the open-circuit voltages (Voc ) of a selection of solar cells and generate an associated response. The proposed design was implemented using amorphous silicon solar cells,
monocrystalline solar cells, and polycrystalline solar cells. Furthermore, we evaluated the
reliability and uniformity for each type of PUF against variations in temperature and variations in light intensity. We also performed uniqueness testing on monocrystalline silicon
solar cells via Monte Carlo simulations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section I introduces the motivation
for the construction of PUFs from solar cells. In Section II we provide information on
PUFs and solar cells. Section III covers our proposed design methodology including the
underlying architecture. Section IV presents the implementation details of our proposed
design including information on each type of solar cell that was used. Section V describes
the various types of testing and provides the results. Section VI provides a more in-depth
discussion of the results including an analysis of each PUF’s relative performance. Section
VII gives conclusions and offers avenues for potential future work. Material from this
chapter was previously published as “C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal,
and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in CyberPhysical Systems. SN Computer Science, published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”.
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Figure 5.1: Example of integration of solar cells within an IoT system. Material from “C.
Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell
Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science,
published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”

5.1

Introduction

The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of a network of Internet connected devices that have
the ability to transmit information as part of their use in intelligent applications [13]. These
cyber-physical systems offer quality of life improvements by allowing physical objects to
be directly integrated with the digital world. In general, IoT devices tend to be small and
contain a limited battery supply. As a result, these devices are typically subjected to strict
constraints on their power consumption and available hardware resources [2].
Energy harvesting is one technique that shows some promise as a way to improve energy efficiency [84]. Among the various energy harvesting technologies, the use of solar
cells to harvest solar energy provides the highest power density. They are therefore an
ideal choice for powering IoT devices as shown in Fig. 5.1 [104]. Highly efficient solar
cells could even prove to be a viable option for indefinitely powering an IoT device without
requiring a battery replacement. One such example is the Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) solar
cell developed by Alta Devices which has an efficiency of 28.8% [186]. The integration of
cells such as these could drastically increase the amount of time an IoT device can operate
without needing a battery replacement, or even completely eliminate the need to replace
the battery.
IoT devices also face major challenges in the form of security. Two major areas of concern are authentication and access control [112],[74]. The non-volatile memories used to
store secret keys have been shown to be vulnerable to active attacks [7], [91]. Furthermore,
it may be too expensive in terms of cost and energy to introduce high level security through
the addition of tamper resistant circuitry.
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have drawn interest as a hardware security
primitive that could be more specially suited for integration in resource constrained devices. PUFs have been shown to address a variety of security concerns such as IC piracy,
counterfeiting, etc. [155]. They can be used in cyber-physical security and IoT devices as
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a major component in protocols for secure authentication and key management [5] [160]
[124].

5.1.1

Motivation

PUFs are a type of circuit which utilize intrinsic variations introduced during the manufacturing process to create devices that are unique and unclonable. PUFs are commonly
based on CMOS ICs which require dedicated hardware to function correctly. This dedicated hardware results in additional costs in terms of hardware and power consumption. In
recent years, IoT devices have begun incorporating solar cells for tasks such as power generation and sensing. The goal of this work is the creation of a PUF whose integration with
IoT devices would incur a minimal cost in the form of additional hardware. The use of solar
cells provides the potential for a PUF that can be used as a source of power in addition to
security. Solar cells are already a common power source in many remote applications and
locations such as satellites, roadside displays, building rooftops, etc. By finding a way to
leverage these existing components one could add security features without having to add
any additional hardware. The cells’ main purpose would be powering the device, but they
would have the added advantage of also being able to be used as a method of providing security features. Our proposed design should be considered an energy harvesting based PUF
and to the best of our knowledge is the first work to perform extensive testing on different
types of solar cells to evaluate their viability for creating PUFs for cyber-physical systems.

5.2
5.2.1

Background
Physically Unclonable Functions

PUFs are a type of circuit which utilize intrinsic variations introduced during the manufacturing process to create devices that are unique and unclonable. PUFs could serve as a
solution to security problems such as IC piracy, counterfeiting, etc. [155] as their inability
to be cloned would allow for the unambiguous identification of valid devices. Furthermore,
they can be used in cyber-physical security and IoT devices as a major component in protocols for secure authentication and key management [5] [160] [124]. Silicon based PUFs
such as arbiter PUF [101], Ring Oscillator (RO) [155], SRAM PUF [59] have proven to
be very popular. These types of PUFs utilize transistor level variations to generate unique
responses.

5.2.2

Solar Cells

Solar cells are known for their ability to convert energy from a light source into electricity
with a relatively high conversion efficiency. They can serve as a nearly permanent source
of power with low operating costs while also being virtually free of pollution. Solar cells
generate both voltage and current. This is accomplished by using absorbed light to raise
electrons to a higher energy state which can then be transported into an external circuit.
The separation of photo-generated electrons and holes is achieved through the use of p-n
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Figure 5.2: Solar cell equivalent circuit. Material from “C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R.
Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell Materials for Developing
Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science, published 2020, Copyright
© 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
junctions constructed from semiconductor and inorganic-organic materials (Fig. 5.2). It has
been demonstrated that the incorporation of solar cells can improve the energy efficiency of
IoT devices [183] and by extension improve the energy efficiency of cyber-physical systems
which contain IoT devices. Other researchers have performed preliminary investigations
on designing PUFs based on solar cells [139] [10] [89]. However, either those explorations
weren’t fully formed or the responses produced by those designs were directly tied to the
current light intensity. This should prove a major hindrance towards their implementation
in IoT devices as the light intensity of the operating environment is not typically something
that can be easily modulated.

5.3

Methodology

The first step in designing a PUF based on solar cells is to choose an appropriate electrical
parameter of the solar cells that will serve as the basis for ultimately generating a response.
We believe that choosing a parameter that has a predictable relationship with changes in
environment operating conditions will ultimately result in a more reliable PUF. In this
section, we discuss our chosen solar cell electrical parameter that forms the basis of our
proposed PUF.

5.3.1

Parameters to Design Solar Cell PUF

Perhaps the two most important electrical parameters of solar cells are their open circuit
voltage (Voc ) and their short circuit current (Isc ). Both of these quantities are easily measurable and are fundamentally related through the current-voltage (I-V) equation of a solar
cell [183]. That equation can be seen below:
I = I0 [exp(

qV
) − 1] − IL
ηkT
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(5.1)

where I0 is the reverse saturation current, q is the electron’s charge, η is the diode ideality factor, k is the Boltzmann constant, T is the temperature, and IL is the light generated
current. Voc is the maximum voltage that can be generated by a solar cell and it occurs
when the current I = 0. Similarly, Isc is the largest current that the cell can produce and is
directly dependent on the spectrum of the incident light, i.e. the number of photons and the
quantum efficiency of the solar cell. The previous equation can be rewritten as follows:
Voc =

IL
ηkT
ln( + 1)
q
I0

(5.2)

This equation can be used to directly relate Isc and Voc , because in an ideal situation Isc
is equal to IL . As demonstrated in the above equation, the value of Voc for a solar cell is the
direct result of the light generated current IL and the reverse saturation current I0 . However,
I0 actually has a much greater influence on the value of Voc as IL tends to have only small
variations in value while I0 can actually vary by orders of magnitude. This is because I0
is itself dependent on many solar cell characteristics such as electron-hole recombination
lifetimes, interface state density, defects and impurities, etc. As a result, this value can
vary wildly even among cells that are otherwise “identically produced”. This high degree
of entropy actually makes it an ideal candidate to serve as the basis for designing a PUF.
Unfortunately, the reverse saturation current is not a quantity that can be as easily measured
by a PUF during normal operation and thus other parameters should be considered.
As previously explained and shown in Equation (2), I0 is the only parameter that contributes to Voc that is also known to show orders of magnitudes in variations. This means
that any variations in I0 should likewise manifest in Voc which is far easier to measure than
I0 . It is known that solar cells which should be otherwise identical, such as produced from
the same batch, will actually display variations in their Voc values due to intrinsic variations introduced during the manufacturing process. Furthermore, the Voc values of solar
cells are known to respond in a predictable manner when subjected to changes in both temperature (linear relationship) and light intensity (logarithmic relationship). We believe this
predictability will result in a PUF that is able to generate reliable data in various operating
conditions. It is for these reasons that we selected the open-circuit voltage (Voc ) as the solar
cell parameter on which to base our proposed PUF design.
Solar cells have been constructed from a myriad of different elements. However, silicon has proven to be a very popular choice and therefore we chose to use silicon solar cells
with our proposed solar cell based PUF design. Furthermore, we evaluated our proposed
design using multiple types of silicon solar cells to determine their viability in different environmental conditions. The specific types of silicon solar cells used were Panasonic AM1417CA amorphous silicon solar cells (Voc = 2.4V ), IXYS KXOB22-12X1F monocrystalline solar cells (Voc = 630mV ), and AOSHIKE micro solar panel polycrystalline silicon
solar cells (Vout = 2V ).

5.3.2

Proposed PUF Architecture

Through the photovoltaic effect, solar cells generate a voltage when they are hit by photons. These output voltages will actually vary between solar cells due to intrinsic variations
introduced during the manufacturing process. Our proposed design uses a microcontroller
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with an ADC to first capture these output voltages and convert them to digital values. The
PUF uses these values to generate a 128 bit response by comparing the voltages in a predetermined pattern. Each bit in the generated response is a direct result of a comparison
made between the output voltages from two different groups of solar cells. 128 bits was
chosen since it is a commonly used response size and larger response sizes could require
more solar cells to implement. Further explanation on the actual hardware and software
portions of our proposed design can be found below in Section IV.

5.4

Implementation

In this section, we present actual prototypes of our proposed solar cell based PUF. This
section will highlight the various hardware (solar cells and microcontroller) and software
components of our proposed design.

5.4.1

Hardware Components of Proposed PUF

Each prototype consists of 8 solar cells connected to ADC input pins on a microcontroller.
A personal computer (PC) is used to communicate with the PUFs. In our implementations,
we have used a selection of solar cells. The three types of solar cells were monocrystalline
silicon, polycrystalline silicon, and amorphous silicon. A copy of each type of PUF is
shown in Figure 5.3.

(a) Amorphous silicon PUF

(b) Monocrystalline silicon
PUF

(c) Polycrystalline silicon
PUF

Figure 5.3: Prototype solar cell based PUFs. Material from “C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar,
R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell Materials for Developing
Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science, published 2020, Copyright
© 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”

Amorphous Silicon Solar Cells
The amorphous cells used in our design were Panasonic AM-1417CA amorphous silicon
solar cells [130]. Amorphous silicon cells do not have the regular atomic arrangements that
are present in crystal silicon cells. This irregular atomic arrangement allows for more light
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absorption and thus certain types of amorphous silicon cells can be produced that have a
film thicknesses of less than 1 µm [130]. The specific model we tested was designed for
use in indoor applications such as wireless sensor networks, RF remote controls, battery
chargers, etc. They have an open-circuit voltage (Voc ) of 2.4V with a max power of 18.75
µW . Table 5.1 provides a complete list of the electrical parameters of the amorphous
silicon solar cells.
Table 5.1: Electrical Parameters of the Amorphous Silicon Solar Cells Used in our Experiments
Cell parameters

Typical ratings

Open-circuit voltage
2.4V
Short circuit current
13.5 µA
Max. power
18.75 µW
Voltage at max. power point 1.5V
Current at max. power point 12.5 µA

Monocrystalline Silicon Solar Cells
The monocrystalline cells used were the IXYS KXOB22-12X1F monocrystalline solar
cells [70] which are used for various battery operated consumer products such as mobile
phones, cameras, MP3 players, etc. These solar cells also have applications in IoT based
devices such as wireless sensors, RFID tags, etc. These solar cells have very good response
over a wide wavelength range and therefore can be used in a variety of indoor and outdoor
applications. They have an open-circuit voltage (Voc ) of 630 mV with an efficiency of 22%.
Table 5.2 provides a complete list of the electrical parameters of the monocrystalline silicon
solar cells.
Table 5.2: Electrical Parameters of the Monocrystalline Silicon Solar Cells Used in our
Experiments
Cell parameters

Typical ratings

Open-circuit voltage
630 mV
Short circuit current density 42.4 mA/cm2
Max. peak power
18.6 mW/cm2
Voltage at max. power point 501 mV
Fill factor
≥ 70%
Solar cell efficiency
22%

Polycrystalline Silicon Solar Cells
Polycrystalline silicon solar cells are made of multiple silicon crystals. This differs from
monocrystalline silicon solar cells where the entire cell is comprised of a single silicon
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crystal. Polycrystalline tends to have a cheaper manufacturing process than monocrystalline silicon. However, the existance of multiple crystals means they also tend to be less
efficient. The polycrystalline silicon solar cells were AOSHIKE micro solar panel polycrystalline silicon solar cells. We were not able to find a data sheet for the cells. The
information provided by their Amazon listing rates their peformance as an output voltage
(Vout ) of 2V and a current of 130 mA. They are a suitable power source in applications such
as low-power electrical appliances, small motors, solar water pumps, lighting, etc. [9].
Microcontroller
Our proposed design requires using an ADC and a microcontroller to measure the solar cell output voltages. These voltage values are compared in a pre-determined pattern
to generate a 128-bit response. Our example implementations (Figure 5.3) use a Tiva
TM4C123GH6PM. We chose these as they have already been included in multiple applications such as network appliances and switches, remote monitoring, factory automation,
etc. [67]. For testing purposes we use a PC to send challenges and receive responses via
UART.
The ADC within that board is 12 bits. It should not necessarily be viewed as a requirement that other implementations must also use a 12-bit ADC. Our testing results from
the next section will show that it is sufficient for creating a PUF. It is worth noting that
changes in ADC resolution could cause differences in the results. At a minimum, other
implementations should use an ADC with a high enough resolution that it is able to detect
the voltage variations between each solar cell. Realistically a PUF is not going to have
its ADC replaced so there is not a major concern on how changing the resolution would
change the response. This would effectively be replacing the PUF in which case it is no
longer expected to produce the same response. The exact effect, if any, that changing the
ADC’s resolution would have on the PUFs, we consider that to be outside the scope of the
work presented in this chapter.

5.4.2

Software Components of Proposed PUF

The software running on the microcontroller is responsible for actually generating the
PUF’s response. The microcontroller must sample each connected solar cell through its
ADC and then generate a response. For the actual comparison algorithm used to generate
the response, we used the one described in [92]. Our implementation required accounting for the inherent noise in the ADC. This was done by averaging 16,000 readings per
cell. The sampling rate was 125,000 samples per second and microcontroller speed was
20MHz. A PC was used to communicate via UART with the PUFs. This was mostly for
testing purposes as it allowed us to easily record the generated responses.

5.5

Testing and Results

Reliability testing and uniformity testing were performed on three copies of each type of
solar cell PUF. Both metrics were evaluated with respect to changes in temperature and
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Figure 5.4: Temperature testing chamber. Material from “C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R.
Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell Materials for Developing
Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science, published 2020, Copyright
© 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
changes in light intensity.

5.5.1

Testing with Respect to Temperature

A temperature chamber was used to evaluate the reliability of the generated responses over
a range of temperatures from -20°C to 80°C. 25°C was used as the reference temperature for reliability testing and measurements were taken in increments of 5°C. A “LEDLENSER® V6 7732” was used to provide a constant source of light within the sealed
testing chamber. The complete testing setup is shown in Figure 5.4.
Reliability Testing
The reliability of a PUF is a measure of how well it can reproduce a given response with
respect to changes in a specified environment condition such as temperature. The reliability
of a n-bit response can be calculated by the following equation:
k

0

1 X HD(Ri , Ri,t )
×%
Reliability = 100% −
k i=1
n

(5.3)

where HD denotes the hamming distance between a reference response Ri from PUF
0
i and a separate response Ri,t from PUF i that has been generated under different environmental conditions. A total of k n-bit responses are generated under different environmental
64

conditions in order to calculate the average hamming distance. The ideal reliability value
is 100% which indicates that the PUF will always generate the correct response regardless
of changes in its operating environment.
Figure 5.5 shows the reliability values of the amorphous silicon PUFs and Table 5.3
shows the average reliability values for each copy of the PUF across the measured temperature range. The first copy of the PUF (PUF1) showed a remarkable consistency that
manifested as an average reliability of 96.39%. However, this was an outlier as the other
copies of the PUF did not fare nearly as well. There were pronounced drops in reliability
as the temperature moved farther away from the reference value of 25°C and as a result
overall average reliability was only 84.41%.
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Figure 5.5: Amorphous silicon reliability with respect to temperature. Material from “C.
Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell
Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science,
published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
Figure 5.6 shows the reliability values for each of the monocrystalline silicon PUFs
and Table 5.3 contains the average reliability for each copy of the PUF. The reliability of
each copy of the PUF exhibited consistent changes as the temperature deviated from the
reference value of 25°C and resulted in an overall average of 88.87%.
Figure 5.7 shows the reliability values for each of the polycrystalline silicon PUFs and
Table 5.3 contains the average reliability for each copy of the PUF. The reliability values
of the second and third copies of the PUF (PUF2 and PUF3) showed consistent behavior
across the range of temperatures measured. PUF1 displayed similar reliability values for
temperatures up to 50°C. Beyond that temperature the device demonstrated a notable drop
in reliability that did not occur in the other copies of the PUF. Despite this, the PUFs still
produced an overall average reliability of 91.20%.
The polycrystalline silicon PUFs displayed the highest average reliability at 91.20%
while the amorphous silicon PUFs displayed the lowest average reliability at 84.41%. The
monocrystalline PUF displayed the most consistency as it was the only type to have the
reliability values of each copy fall within 2.5 percentage points of each other.
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Figure 5.6: Monocrystalline silicon reliability with respect to temperature. Material from
“C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell
Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science,
published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
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Figure 5.7: Polycrystalline silicon reliability with respect to temperature. Material from “C.
Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell
Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science,
published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
Uniformity Testing
The uniformity is a measure of how balanced a PUF’s response is in terms of the number
of 1’s and 0’s. The ideal uniformity value is 50% which denotes that there are an equal
number of 1’s and 0’s. Uniformity can be calculated by the following equation:
n

1X
ri,l × 100%
U nif ormity =
n l=1

(5.4)

where ri,l represents the l-th bit of response from PUF instance i.
Figure 5.8 shows the uniformity values of the amorphous silicon PUFs and Table 5.4
shows the average uniformity values for each copy of the PUF across the measured temperature range. The three amorphous silicon PUFs produced a combined average uniformity
of 49.34% across the tested temperature range.
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Table 5.3: Average Reliability with Respect to Temperature
PUF1
Amorphous
Monocrystalline
Polycrystalline

PUF2

PUF3

Overall

96.39 % 75.41 % 81.44 % 84.41 %
87.57 % 89.84 % 89.21 % 88.87 %
86.31 % 93.38 % 93.90 % 91.20 %
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Figure 5.8: Amorphous silicon uniformity with respect to temperature. Material from “C.
Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell
Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science,
published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
Figure 5.9 shows the uniformity values for each of the monocrystalline silicon PUFs
and Table 5.4 contains the average uniformity for each copy of the PUF. Overall, the
monocrystalline silicon PUFs had a combined average uniformity of 49.47%.
Figure 5.10 shows the uniformity values for each of the polycrystalline silicon PUFs
and Table 5.4 contains the average uniformity for each copy of the PUF. Overall, the polycrystalline silicon PUFs had a combined average uniformity of 51.26%
Despite changes in temperature, the uniformity values for each response generated by
the different PUFs remained near the ideal value of 50%. The monocrystalline silicon
PUFs had the average uniformity closest to the ideal value at 49.47%. Even though the
polycrystalline silicon PUFs had the worst overall average uniformity, their overall average
value of 51.26% was still close to the ideal value.
Table 5.4: Average Uniformity with Respect to Temperature
PUF1
Amorphous
Monocrystalline
Polycrystalline

PUF2

PUF3

Overall

47.88 % 51.38 % 48.77 % 49.34 %
51.49 % 50.52 % 46.39 % 49.47 %
50.97 % 52.08 % 50.74 % 51.26 %

67

56

Uniformity (%)

54

PUF1
PUF2
PUF3

52
50
48
46
44
-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Temperature (°C)

Figure 5.9: Monocrystalline silicon uniformity with respect to temperature. Material from
“C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell
Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science,
published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”

5.5.2

Testing with Respect to Light Intensity

Unlike in standard CMOS ICs, light intensity plays a major role in controlling the electrical
properties of solar cells. It is therefore very important to analyze the performance of our
proposed PUFs against variations in light intensity. Testing was performed by using a variable transformer to vary the intensity of a LED bulb from 40W atts/m2 to 90W atts/m2 .
Readings were taken in increments of 5W atts/m2 and 40W atts/m2 was used as the reference for reliability testing. Our tested range was directly influenced by the testing facilities
available to us. The complete testing setup is shown in Figure 5.11.
Reliability Testing
Figure 5.12 shows the reliability values of the amorphous silicon PUFs and Table 5.5 shows
the average reliability values for each copy of the PUF across the measured range of light
intensities. The three amorphous silicon PUFs produced a combined average reliability of
97.75% across the tested range.
Figure 5.13 shows the reliability values for each of the monocrystalline silicon PUFs
and Table 5.5 contains the average reliability for each copy of the PUF. The first copy of
the PUF (PUF1) demonstrated a sharper drop in reliability as light intensity increased when
compared to the other instances of the PUF (PUF2 and PUF3). Overall, the monocrystalline
silicon PUFs had a combined average reliability of 96.12%.
Figure 5.14 shows the reliability values for each of the polycrystalline silicon PUFs
and Table 5.5 contains the average reliability for each copy of the PUF. The second copy
of the PUF (PUF1) demonstrated a gradual decline in reliability as light intensity increased
whereas the other instances of the PUF (PUF1 and PUF3) remained very consistent. Overall, the polycrystalline silicon PUFs had a combined average reliability of 95.45%
All of the PUFs tended to show resistance to changes in light intensity. The reliability
tended to only gradually degrade as the light intensity increased with seven of the nine
tested PUFs never dipping below 90%. The amorphous silicon has the highest overall
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Figure 5.10: Polycrystalline silicon uniformity with respect to temperature. Material from
“C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell
Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science,
published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
average reliability at 97.75% while even the worst one (polycrystalline) was still above
95% at 95.45%.
Table 5.5: Average Reliability with Respect to Light Intensity
PUF1
Amorphous
Monocrystalline
Polycrystalline

PUF2

PUF3

Overall

98.37 % 96.31 % 98.58 % 97.75 %
93.32 % 97.44 % 97.59 % 96.12 %
97.30 % 93.39 % 95.67 % 95.45 %

Uniformity Testing
Figure 5.15 shows the uniformity values of the amorphous silicon PUFs and Table 5.6
shows the average uniformity values for each copy of the PUF across the measured range
of light intensities. The three amorphous silicon PUFs produced a combined average uniformity of 50.00% across the tested range. There was little variation in the uniformity
values for each PUF as light intensity increased. However, the second copy of the PUF
(PUF2) was noticeably higher than the other two copies (PUF1 and PUF3).
Figure 5.16 shows the uniformity values for each of the monocrystalline silicon PUFs
and Table 5.6 contains the average uniformity for each copy of the PUF. Overall, the
monocrystalline silicon PUFs had a combined average uniformity of 52.81%.
Figure 5.17 shows the uniformity values for each of the polycrystalline silicon PUFs
and Table 5.6 contains the average uniformity for each copy of the PUF. Overall, the polycrystalline silicon PUFs had a combined average uniformity of 48.74%
Variations in light intensity did not appear to have any consistent effect on the uniformity of the responses generated by each type of PUF. The uniformity value for each copy
of the different PUFs remained close to the ideal value of 50% and the average uniformity
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Figure 5.11: Light intensity testing chamber. Material from “C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar,
R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell Materials for Developing
Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science, published 2020, Copyright
© 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
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Figure 5.12: Amorphous silicon reliability with respect to light intensity. Material from “C.
Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell
Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science,
published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
for the amorphous silicon PUFs was was the best exactly 50.00%. However, it is worth
noting that this PUF also had the lowest recorded uniformity at 46.16% and the highest at
56.18%.
Table 5.6: Average Uniformity with Respect to Light Intensity
PUF1
Amorphous
Monocrystalline
Polycrystalline

5.5.3

PUF2

PUF3

Overall

46.16 % 56.18 % 47.66 % 50.00 %
53.12 % 50.99 % 54.33 % 52.81 %
50.28 % 47.44 % 48.51 % 48.74 %

Uniqueness Testing

The uniqueness is a measure of how well a single PUF can be distinguished from the
population as a whole. The ideal uniqueness value is 50% which effectively denotes that
between any two PUF responses there is an equal probability that a given bit position
between the responses will have unequal or equal values. It is calculated by using the
following equation:
k−1 X
k
X
2
HD(Ri , Rj )
U niqueness =
× 100%
k(k − 1) i=1 j=i+1
n
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Figure 5.13: Monocrystalline silicon reliability with respect to light intensity. Material
from “C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of
Solar Cell Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer
Science, published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
This equation effectively calculates the average hamming distance (HD) between every
possible pair of PUFs in a population containing k total PUF copies. Ri and Rj are n-bit
responses generated by PUF instances i and j, respectively such that i 6= j.
Uniqueness testing requires testing a relatively large number of PUF instances. Since
creating that many physical PUF copies is not typically feasible, it is standard to perform
Monte Carlo simulations in order to evaluate the uniqueness property of proposed PUFs.
Unfortunately, the datasheets associated with our specific choices of solar cells only provide
typical electrical parameter values. This makes it impossible for us to accurately generate
the normal distribution of cells that would be required for a Monte Carlo simulation.
This closest approximation would be to use values for the the different solar cell materials that have been reported by other literature sources. Monocrystalline solar cells were
previously reported to have a possible voltage range of ±5% [170]. The values reported
in that work have been used by other works which have proposed methods for generating
mathematical models of solar cell parameters [171]. Using this range we can generate a
normal distribution of 8000 solar cells and randomly select 8 at a time to created 1000
simulated PUFs. The uniqueness calculated for the responses was 49.989% which is very
close to the ideal value of 50%.

5.6

Discussion

In general, solar cells have been utilized as a power source for various IoT devices such
as wireless sensors, RFIDs, etc. In this chapter, we have utilized the intrinsic variations
between solar cells to create a PUF. Doing so effectively allows the solar cells to be used
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Figure 5.14: Polycrystalline silicon reliability with respect to light intensity. Material from
“C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell
Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science,
published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
as a method for adding security features to these devices.
When compared to existing silicon PUFs, our design has the distinction that it could
theoretically be implemented by a device without adding additional hardware. The integration of a silicon PUF would require a specially designed circuit which would not already
exist on the device. Our proposed design methodology and Silicon PUF designs are not
necessarily direct competitors despite the fact that they are both PUFs. Our proposed approach was specifically designed for applications where it was impossible to implement a
Silicon PUF (e.g. adding security without adding hardware).
In this chapter we evaluated three different types of solar cell materials by performing
temperature testing for the range -20°C to 80°C and light intensity testing for the range
40 W atts/m2 to 90W atts/m2 . Each test was conducted on three copies of each type of
PUF. We also evaluated the uniqueness of monocrystalline silicon through Monte Carlo
simulations on a population of 1000 simulated PUFs.
In our experiments, we created PUFs using Panasonic AM-1417CA amorphous silicon solar cells (Voc = 2.4V ), IXYS KXOB22-12X1F monocrystalline solar cells (Voc =
630mV ), and AOSHIKE micro solar panel polycrystalline silicon solar cells (Vout = 2V ).
We created three copies of each PUF per type of solar cell for a total of nine PUFs. This
allowed us to begin creating performance benchmarks for some popular types of solar cells
when they are used in the creation of PUFs. Each copy was created from randomly chosen
solar cells of each type. This means there is not anything purposely different between the
different copies of a PUF per each type of solar cell. Any variation in testing results among
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Figure 5.15: Amorphous silicon uniformity with respect to light intensity. Material from
“C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell
Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science,
published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
the three copies of a given material should be a manifestation of their random intrinsic
variations. This means that in tests where one PUF has noticeably different performance
than the other two copies, those differences are the result of random chance rather than an
explicit difference between the PUF copies. An example of this can be seen in the testing
of reliability with respect to temperature for amorphous silicon where PUF1 had noticably
different performance than PUF2 and PUF3.
On average, the polycrystalline silicon based PUFs had the best reliability with respect
to temperature at 91.20% while the amorphous silicon based PUFs had the worst average
reliability at 84.41%. Their standings are actually inverted with respect to Light Intensity
as polycrystalline silicon had the worst average reliability at 95.45% and amorphous silicon
had the best value at 97.74%. In addition, the uniformity values of the responses generated
from these PUFs were also recorded and the average values for each type of solar cell were
sufficiently close to the ideal value of 50%.
Based on the results of our testing, it can be inferred that polycrystalline solar cells are
the ideal choice for PUFs that will be subjected to large variations in temperature. Our
results also indicate that amorphous silicon solar cells are best suited for PUF applications
where the major environmental concern is variation in light intensity. However, it is also
worth considering the fact that the reliabilities with respect to light intensity were consistently higher than the reliabilities with respect to temperature. This would seem to imply
that the PUFs have a higher resistance to light intensity variations than they do to temper74
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Figure 5.16: Monocrystalline silicon uniformity with respect to light intensity. Material
from “C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of
Solar Cell Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer
Science, published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
ature variations for at least over the range that we tested. In an application scenario where
variations in light intensity are the primary concern, special considerations must be made to
ensure that any variations in temperature will be kept to an absolute minimum. Otherwise,
seemingly minor changes in temperature could cause amorphous silicon to go from being
the best option of our tested types of solar cells to the worst option.
Although we were not able to perform uniqueness testing on the specific cells used in
our prototypes, we were at least able to evaluate the uniqueness of monocrystalline silicon
solar cells. Through Monte Carlo simulation of 1000 simulated PUFs, it was determined
that the uniqueness was 49.989%. While we can’t draw any firm conclusions about PUFs
constructed using amorphous silicon or polycrystalline silicon solar cells, the monocrystalline results are at the least not a discouraging sign for the uniqueness prospects of the
other materials.
Based on the results of our testing we have noticed a curious trend related to the reliability of the cells with respect to temperature. The temperature coefficient of a solar cell
is a measure how well the performs with respect to changes in temperature. The closer the
coefficient is to 0% then the less the cell’s output will drop as the temperature increases.
Therefore, a lower temperature coefficient indicates better performance with respect to
temperature. Among the materials we tested, researchers have shown amorphous silicon to
perform the best as temperatures increase. That is followed by monocrystalline silicon solar
cells with the next best performance, and polycrystalline had the worst performance [36]
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Figure 5.17: Polycrystalline silicon uniformity with respect to light intensity. Material from
“C. Labrado, S. D. Kumar, R. Badhan, H. Thapliyal, and V. Singh, Exploration of Solar Cell
Materials for Developing Novel PUFs in Cyber-Physical Systems. SN Computer Science,
published 2020, Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd”
[38]. Based on these characteristics one would expect to see the PUFs constructed from
these materials to exhibit the same relative performance when it comes to their reliability
with respect to temperature. However, our testing has revealed the pollycrystalline PUF
to have the best reliability with respect to temperature followed by monocrystalline and
then amorphous. This is the exact inverse of their normal performance with respect to temperature. Determining what the reason is for the inverse correlation between temperature
coefficients and PUF reliability could be further investigated as a future work.

5.7

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have proposed a design methodology to create PUFs from solar cells.
This PUF uses the open-circuit voltages from the individual solar cells as the source of
entropy in generating responses. Furthermore, we created copies of the PUF based around
three different types of solar cells: amorphous silicon, monocrystalline silicon, and polycrystalline silicon. We evaluated the reliability and uniformity of our proposed design
over a temperature range of -20°C to 80°C and a light intensity range of 40W atts/m2 to
90W atts/m2 . From our testing we determined that the polycrystalline silicon PUFs had
the highest average reliability with respect to temperature at 91.20% and the amorphous
silicon PUFs had the highest average reliability with respect to light intensity at 97.74%.
Furthermore, our Monte Carlo simulations on monocrystalline silicon showed that a PUF
based on monocrystalline solar cells could have a uniqueness value of 49.989%.
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The exploratory nature of this work presents multiple avenues for future work. There
are other solar cell materials besides the three we evaluated which could similarly be suitable for the creation of PUFs. Our testing was performed with limited sample sizes. However, the results are encouraging and thus warrant further testing over greatly expanded
sample populations. One potential future area of work would be performing more thorough
investigations on a larger population. Large scale testing could be of interest for commercialization purposes where it would be useful to generate results that can be considered
as accurate as possible for the entire population. Large scale testing would also allow for
uniqueness testing to be performed on actual physical devices rather than simulated copies.
A further goal would be to improve the design to allow the solar cells to act as both
a source of power and a source of entropy for the PUF. Standard solar cell usage only
provides the former while our proposed design only allows for the latter. Combining the
two should be feasible, but the actual circuit must still be designed. This would allow the
PUF to effectively serve as a source of both power and security and ease its integration into
IoT devices. As part of this integration, it would be worth exploring how best to integrate
this behavior so that its operation does not run into conflict with the real time nature or
other operating constraints of the devices.
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Chapter 6
Fortifying Vehicular Security Through
Low Overhead Physically Unclonable
Functions
The adoption of PUFs would allow for the integration novel security solutions to cyberphysical systems. Consider a vehicle as one example of a cyber-physical system. The
Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is a major method of communication between a vehicles critical systems. CAN was designed without any built in security features and adding
traditional security features is not easily achieved without requiring major changes to the
CAN protocol or the underlying hardware. Providing security thus requires developing
completely new methods. In this chapter we propose a new security framework that adds
security features while minimizing overhead and without making any changes to the basic
CAN protocol. This framework is a server-based approach where a central server connected
to the CAN bus is responsible for authenticating all connected nodes and generating session keys. The design utilizes physically unclonable functions (PUFs) as the basis for key
storage, key generation, and the authentication of the nodes. Lightweight cryptographic
algorithms are employed as they are more aptly suited than standard cryptographic algorithms to the resource constrained environments of vehicles. Figure 6.1 shows an example
of the proposed framework incorporated into a smart vehicle environment.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section I introduces a major security
concern in vehicles; Section II presents our vision for using PUFs as a low overhead smart
car security solution; Section III describes related work on consumer electronics security
and provides background information on CAN, its vulnerabilities, and PUFs; Section IV
describes the proposed framework’s operation in detail; Section V analyzes the framework
and its security capabilities; Section VI provides a comparison to other PUF-based security
frameworks; lastly, Section VII concludes the chapter.

6.1

Introduction

Vehicles are no longer a purely mechanical machine. Modern vehicles include a not insignificant number of digital components such as infotainment systems and the electronic
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control units (ECUs) that are responsible for controlling the various subsystems within the
vehicle. These devices are connected via various intra-vehicle networks, the most notable
being the Controller Area Network (CAN) which provides a relatively inexpensive method
for several ECUs to communicate with each other [39].
Unfortunately, CAN was not developed with security in mind. The lack of security has
become much more alarming over the last decade as researchers have been able to successfully attack vehicles by exploiting the shortcomings in the CAN protocol. A very notable
example of this was in 2015 when researchers were able to control a consumer vehicle
[119]. Due to the nature of CAN, the ECUs for such systems as the engine, brakes, and
steering were all connected to the same CAN bus. All an attacker needs to do to carry out
an attack is gain access to the CAN bus. This could be achieved through somehow compromising an ECU or more simply creating their own connection. The lack of security features
means that all transmitted messages are treated as being from a valid source regardless of
their actual origin. For example, an attacker could send a message instructing the vehicle
to apply the brakes. The vehicle would comply as it has no way of verifying the validity of
the message.
The issue of vehicular security is likely to become even more pressing in the coming
years. This in large part can be contributed to the continual push to develop fully autonomous vehicles in addition to the inclusion of smart features in vehicles. Every new type
of connection added to a vehicle represents a new potential attack surface for malicious actors. Some of the connections include vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-network (V2N),
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P). This overall connected environment is collectively referred to as vehicle-to-everything (V2X) [28].

Figure 6.1: PUF Integrated Smart Vehicle
It is difficult to design a singular security solution since a vehicle’s expanded features
are provided by separate subsystems which communicate via in-vehicle communication
networks. There in fact exists a knowledge gap in terms of how damage could by caused
by attacking various components and systems of the vehicle. For example, it has been
shown to be possible to compromise some of a vehicle’s sensors in order to trick the driver
and/or the vehicle’s control system. However, it is unknown just how vulnerable all of the
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sensors are and how severe of a reaction can be induced by a hacked sensor generating
erroneous readings [132].
This is a constantly evolving problem that demands regularly devising new techniques
to combat previously unknown vulnerabilities. However, vulnerabilities that have been
known for years demand a similar level of time and focus. A major target should be devising solutions for the inherent vulnerabilities in the CAN bus. Because CAN is such a
fundamental communication network, any potential security solutions should seek to remain as true as possible to the original specification. Major deviations could result in the
need to redesign an untold number of internal systems to make them compatible with the
new solution.

6.2

Our Vision for PUF-based Low Overhead Smart Car
Security

We believe that the security challenges facing vehicles are so unique that classical security
approaches alone will not be sufficient. Vehicles are designed such that some of their
core functionality is directly provided by inherently insecure components and subsystems.
These components are in fact so well ingrained that replacing all of them would likely
require vehicles to be fundamentally redesigned from the ground up. While an approach
like this could work in theory, the sheer cost of design, not to mention the material costs
of the new components, would seem to prevent this from being a truly viable option for
anything short of very long term goals.
In addition to providing security, we believe that for a security solution to be more
immediately viable it should minimize both the monetary and computational costs that
would be incurred by its introduction to the vehicle. As such, there are three major design
goals that vehicle security solutions should strive to meet:
1. Minimize additional hardware and computation.
2. Avoid significant changes in protocols.
3. Minimize communication overhead.
First, security solutions should seek to minimize the addition of extra hardware and
computation. The resource constrained and real-time nature of vehicles does not allow
for much extra computation for things like encryption. Upgrading the existing devices or
adding specialized hardware to provide the resources needed for the additional computation
would drive up implementation costs.
Second, solutions should not make any significant changes to protocols. We consider
significant changes to include any modification that would require likewise changes in the
supporting hardware. For example, replacing a communication protocol or adding additional message fields cannot occur without upgrading the current infrastructure to support
the new features.
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Lastly, a solution should try to minimize communication overhead so that it does not
effectively violate the second goal without actually changing the protocol itself. Some protocols like CAN can only send a very limited amount of data per message. Breaking a single
transmission across multiple CAN messages allows for the transmission of cryptographic
keys and encrypted data, but at the cost of reducing the bandwidth and responsiveness of
the network.
Many potential security solutions would introduce additional overhead in both computation and the number of additional messages that must be sent in support of the normal
transmission of data [182] [82] [147]. Furthermore, some solutions would likely require the
addition of hardware for features such as secure key storage and generation, data encryption, etc. The use of physically unclonable functions (PUFs) in security solutions could
potentially provide a cheaper option for the implementation of some of the these features.
PUF-based security solutions would thus more closely align with our previously stated design goals. It is for that reason that our proposed security framework is directly based on
PUFs. An example of this integration, which is used by our proposed framework, is shown
in Figure 6.2. Every ECU would include its own PUF which could then be utilized by a
variety of security operations. Integration of a PUF in this manner would leave open the
possibility of maintaining the underlying CAN protocol and thus should not require any
modifications to the actual CAN network infrastructure that connects the ECUs.

Figure 6.2: ECU PUF Integration

6.3
6.3.1

Background
Prior Related Work on Consumer Electronics Security

Providing security to vehicles is a challenging problem that is not readily solvable by conventional solutions. Even just the diagnosis of security threats has required the development
of novel intrusion detection methods [121]. However, the security issues facing vehicles
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are not as isolated as they might appear. Similar security concerns are actually being raised
in a variety of other areas. This general trend is a direct response to society’s adoption
of the Internet of Things (IoT). The addition of smart features to an increasing number of
consumer electronics has also introduced security vulnerabilities and concerns that were
not present when the devices were originally designed.
Developing methods to combat these new challenges has drawn interest from a number
of researchers. This has included classical approaches such as designing hardware security chips for mobile devices [74] and secure firmware validation and update schemes for
personal home devices [31]. Other areas of interest include security architecture for edge
devices [163] and protecting the runtime data of embedded systems through hardwareenhanced cryptographic engines including AES and the hashing algorithm LHash [174].
Researchers have also taken to examing more novel security approaches such as creating PUFs that are specifically designed for use in IoT applications. This has included both
adaptations of established designs such as Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF [80] along with novel
approaches such as designs based on adiabatic logic [90] and bloom filters on memristorbased PUFs [100]. Researchers have explored how PUFs such as these could serve as the
basis for more complete security frameworks and systems. One interesting example is a
framework in which individual embedded devices use PUFs to create their own unique fingerprints [62]. Those fingerprints are then encoded in order construct a larger system-level
fingerprint. In this way the system level ID can be used to identify if one of the system’s
individual devices is no longer valid. Another approach utilizes memristor-based PUFs to
create a very lightweight security system [167]. The PUFs operate as a one time pad by
generating a random key each time one is needed for an encryption and decryption operation. A random response is sent to the PUF and the associated response is used as the
key. Other research efforts have included using PUFs to create novel device authentication
schemes for IoT-enabled medical devices [187] and radio-frequency (RF) communication
between nodes in a wireless network [24]. The inclusion of PUFs has the potential to thus
introduce security features into an intra-vehicle network while minimizing any changes in
its normal operation.

6.3.2

Controller Area Network (CAN)

The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a serial communication system that allows for
simple and efficient message passing between connected nodes without requiring a master
controller in the network [39]. CAN is most commonly used in vehicles to allow communication between the embedded electronic control units (ECUs) without having to implement
point to point wiring between all possible communication paths. Figure 6.3 shows the
format of a standard CAN frame or message. A standard CAN frame has a very limited
number of message fields. The arbitration portion denotes the ID of the message. The
control field shows the number of bytes of data (0-8 bytes) being sent by the frame. CRC
stands for cyclic redundancy check and is an error correcting code used to check for errors
in the transmission. ACK is used to denote if a message was successfully received. Lastly,
EOF denotes the end of the frame.
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Figure 6.3: CAN Frame

6.3.3

CAN Vulnerabilities

The CAN protocol was not originally designed to include much in the way of security features. The key issues are messages are broadcast to all connected nodes, the data fields are
not encrypted, and there is no way to authenticate or even known who was responsible for
sending a given message. An attacker only has to gain access to the CAN bus in order to
carry out a wide arrange of attacks including eavesdropping, spoofing/impersonation, and
denial of service (DoS). Through eavesdropping an attacker would be able to monitor all
communications and launch a replay attack by sending a duplicate of a previously seen
message [86]. Another possibility would be to reverse engineer what would be the (likely
manufacturer-specific) communication protocol used between nodes. Once that was accomplished, an attacker would be able to send erroneous messages that the targeted ECUs
would interpret to be valid due to CAN’s inherent lack of authenticity. Researchers have
shown that attacks of this nature can be utilized to control different components of the
vehicle such as controlling the dashboard and shutting off the engine [181].
The CAN protocol also makes CAN very susceptible to DoS attacks. The CAN standard guarantees that the message with the highest priority will be the first message to go
through. If the CAN bus is currently in the process of transmitting a message, it will stop
that transmission and begin to transmit the new message provided that new message has a
higher priority. An attacker only has to repeatedly transmit high priority messages for the
CAN protocol to guarantee that the messages from ECUs will never get a chance to send
due to having a lower priority [23].

6.3.4

Physically Unclonable Functions

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a class of device that utilize internal variations
introduced by the manufacturing process to generate unique outputs for a given input. The
input to a PUF is denoted as a “challenge” and the output is known as a “response”. A
challenge and its associated response are collectively known as a challenge-response pair
(CRP). For a given challenge, the response produced by different PUFs should be unique
since each response is a direct manifestation of the unique physical properties of that specific PUF. Furthermore, a PUF with a small number of CRPs, typically just one, is a weak
PUF and a PUF with a large number of CRPs is considered to be a strong PUF.
PUF designs are commonly based on transistor level process variations such as gate
delays [61] or the initial power-on value in memory cells [118]. Other researchers have explored creating PUFs from larger components such as energy harvesters [129] and sensors
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[98]. The unique properties of PUFs make them an intriguing option as a low cost method
for implementing security related features such as key storage [45] or hardware obfuscation
[176].

6.4

Proposed CAN Security Framework

The overall design of our proposed framework involves using a server within the network
to authenticate all nodes before allowing normal message passing operations to begin. The
proposed framework requires an LWC functions for encryption, decryption, and hashing.
Any LWC function can be used as long as it meets certain criteria. The LWC function used
for encryption and decryption must have a block size of 64 bits and a key size of no more
than 128-bits. For the LWC hash function, it must be able to generate 128-bit hashes.
As an example, our proposed framework is described in terms of using PRESENT
[21] for encryption and PHOTON [56] for hashing. We use these as examples as they
have both been defined as International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards
for LWC[68] [69]. Either LWC function could however be substituted with a different
one which meets the aforementioned criteria. The proposed framework also makes use
of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange based on FourQ which has been
shown to offer better performance than other curves targeting the same level of security
[35]. These cryptographic algorithms will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.5. The
proposed framework supports 80-bit or 128-bit encryption keys. For the sake of simplicity,
the figures and tables in this section assume 80-bit encryption keys.
Our proposed framework is not designed for use with only one specific PUF design. It
is assumed that the chosen PUF will be a weak PUF since the framework needs a given
PUF to always produce the same response each session. The keys are derived from the
PUF responses so the keys would change if the response changed. A strong PUF could be
an option if it was configured to operate as a weak PUF by always providing it the same
response. Topics related to the actual implementation of the PUF should be considered
outside the scope of this chapter. This includes methods for improving the reliabilities of
PUFs such as error correcting codes and other schemes. Additional resources required for
a specific PUF implementation are likewise a direct result of the chosen PUF rather than
our proposed framework.
The proposed framework can be divided into the distinct operation phases of enrollment, authentication, and normal operation. The authentication and normal operation
phases will occur every time the system is turned on. By contrast, enrollment would ideally only ever occur once for the entire existence of the system. The rest of this section
describes each of the phases in greater detail.

6.4.1

Enrollment

This phase should only occur once, likely during the manufacturing phase. This should
in theory provide a secure environment for data to be hardcoded into the server and other
nodes. The purpose of the enrollment phase is to give each node a copy of the server’s
public key. This allows each node to ultimately derive a shared secret with the server that
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Figure 6.4: Post-Enrollment Stored Values
it can use to securely communicate with the server during the authentication phase. The
server will likewise need to have a copy of the public key for every node. In addition, the
server needs to store a hash of the response from each node. The response hashes are 128
bits in size which means future stages will only need 2 CAN frames to transmit the entire
hash.
We use response hashes rather than raw responses for two main reason. The first reason
is it allows greater flexibility in choosing a type of PUF to use within the framework.
Choosing a PUF with a response larger than 128 bits won’t increase the number of CAN
frames required for a node to send it to the server. The other reason is this prevents sending
the PUF’s response outside of the node. Even though the responses would be encrypted,
the server would still need to do a comparison with the unencrypted response in order to
validate it. The raw response can be used to directly generate a secret key, while it is not
possible to do the same with a hash of the response. This removes the need to take the
same security precautions with storing and handling the response hash that you would need
if you were instead using the raw response.
During authentication a node will be considered valid if it is able to generate a response
whose hash matches the associated one stored by the server. Figure 6.4 provides a visualization of what data will be stored within each entity at the end of the enrollment phase.

6.4.2

Authentication

The authentication phase should run every time the network is first powered on. Within
this phase the server will first validate the authenticity of each node in the system. Next
it will generate a session key and send a hashed copy to each node to use during normal
operation. Algorithm 3 describes the individual steps taken by a given node and Algorithm
4 describes the steps for the server. These steps assume 80-bit encryption keys. In addition,
the entire authentication process is illustrated in Figure 6.5.
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Algorithm 3 Node Authentication Process
1: The node’s PUF generates a response R.
2: A 128-bit hash of the response is created HR . The response is also used as the node’s
secret key x by FourQ.
3: A shared secret SSec between the node and the server is generated using the node’s
private key x and the stored public key of the server PS .
4: The shared secret is hashed and truncated to produce an 80-bit key KSSec .
5: The node’s hashed response HR is encrypted using the hashed shared secret as the key
KSSec .
6: The encrypted response hash is sent to the server.
7: The node then waits for the server to respond with an encrypted session key.
8: The node decrypts the session key KSess using the hashed shared secret as the key
KSSec .
9: The list of valid nodes is extracted from the decrypted session key if the system was
configured to support it.
10: This session key KSess will later be used during normal operation to encrypt and decrypt all messages within the network.

Algorithm 4 Server Authentication Process
1: The server’s PUF generates a response RS .
2: The response is used as the server’s secret key xS by FourQ.
3: A shared secret SSec between a given node and the server is generated using the
server’s private key xS and the stored public key of the node P.
4: The shared secret SSec is hashed and truncated to produce an 80-bit key KSSec .
5: The server waits to receive encrypted response hashes from each node.
6: The server decrypts the hashes using the hashed shared secret associated with that
specific node as the key KSSec .
7: The decrypted response hashes HR are validated by comparing them to previously
stored hashes.
8: The server generates a random session key KSess and concatenates it with either
padding or a bit mask representing valid nodes in the network.
9: The server encrypts a copy of the concatenated session key KSess for each node using
the hashed shared secret associated with that node as the key KSSec .
10: The server sends an encrypted session key to each node.
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Figure 6.5: Authentication Process
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(a) 80-bit Session Key

(b) 48-bit Valid Bitmask and 80-bit Session Key

(c) 128-bit Session Key

Figure 6.6: Options for Encrypted Session Key Packets
It is important to note that the shared secret between each node and the server is not
directly used as a key for encryption and decryption. We hash the shared secret to get
a shared key. This helps prevent key leakage and reduces the shared secret to the key
size required by the encryption algorithm. The nodes use the shared key to transmit their
response hashes and the server uses it to transmit the session keys.
The only messages sent during this phase are the encrypted response hashes and the
encrypted session keys. The encrypted response hashes are 128 bits in size which means
it will take 2 CAN frames to transmit the entire hash. Similarly, the encrypted session key
must be a multiple of 64 bits in order to minimize the amount of CAN frames required to
transmit it. This allows us to support key sizes of 80 and 128 bits. 80-bit keys would need to
be concatenated with 48 bits of padding. Alternatively, an 80-bit key could be concatenated
with a 48-bit wide bitmask that denotes the nodes that were successfully Authenticated.
Each bit would correspond to a specific node. Figure 6.6 provides an illustration of these
different modes of operation.
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Figure 6.7: Normal Communication Between Two Nodes

6.4.3

Normal Operation

This phase is analogous to the way a normal CAN bus operates and ultimately serves the
same purpose. The major difference is all transmitted data must be encrypted before it is
sent over the bus. Once nodes have have been authenticated by the server and received
a session key, the system can transition to normal communication between nodes in the
network. The session key is used to encrypt the data field of a packet before sending it
across the CAN bus to another node. That other node can then use its own copy of the
session key to decrypt the data and then respond accordingly. Figure 6.7 shows the general
flow for one node communicating with another node.

6.5

Design and Analysis of Proposed Framework

By deriving keys from physically unclonable functions (PUFs), we avoid the need to use
costly secure nonvolatile memory for key storage. Instead, the keys can be generated as
needed during each authentication phase. This means an attacker would have to obtain
physical access to the PUF to recover its response and associated key pair. As we will
explain, the information that must be persistently stored between sessions does not necessarily need to be kept secret and that allows us to save costs by not requiring secure
nonvolatile memory in the nodes.
The public keys can be stored in unsecured memory since they require a separate private key to form a shared secret. The private key is generated whenever it is needed and
deriving a private key from its associated public key would require successfully breaking
the elliptic curve key generation cryptographic algorithm. The hashed responses can also
be stored in unsecured memory since the server expects any received hashed responses to
be encrypted with the appropriate shared secret that it is assumed an attacker is not able
to obtain. Furthermore, since hash functions are considered to be one-way it should not
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be possible to recover the original input response that produced the hash and then use that
response to generate its associated private and public keys.
During each new session, the server generates a session key that will be used by all
ECUs during normal communication. Depending on the mode of operation, that key can
be concatenated with a bit mask denoting which nodes are valid. During authentication a
server with n ECUs will receive n hashed responses and then only have to transmit n total
copies of the generated session key, one for each ECU. Therefore, the number of frames
that must be sent in our proposed framework scales linearly as the number of ECUs in
the system increases. Furthermore, the hashed responses and session key payloads can
each be transmitted in only 2 frames. This means that during the authentication phase of
our proposed framework, a network with n ECUs will require the transmission of 4n total
frames to complete the authentication phase.
The overhead in terms of frames required by the proposed framework is shown in Table
6.1. The enrollment phase is omitted since it would likely not require sending any messages over the CAN bus and would ideally only ever run once. A partial repeat of the
enrollment phase would only need to occur when PUFs are added and/or removed from the
system, e.g. completely replacing a malfunctioning node. The enrollment phase is otherwise completely implementation dependent and occurs outside of the flow of operations for
the system. During normal operation, our proposed framework operates exactly the same
as the standard CAN protocol. The same number of messages are required to transmit the
same amount of data. The only real difference is the data contained within the data field
of the message is now encrypted. The cryptographic operations will of course introduce
some additional overhead, but that will be highly dependent upon the chosen algorithms
and the underlying hardware. Special purpose hardware for example could greatly speed
up calculations or certain cryptosystems may perform better on the specific ECUs used by
a given manufacturer.

6.5.1

Threat Mitigation

The major threat that will be directly mitigated is eavesdropping. Currently an attacker with
access to the CAN bus can see all messages that are transmitted. Our proposed framework
counteracts this by encrypting the actual data that is transmitted. The only potentially useful
information that could then be used by an attacker is the destination IDs of the messages.
Other notable attacks are data tampering and impersonation attacks. As the name suggests, data tampering attacks occur when an attacker is able to successfully modify a message without the sender or receiver being able to detect that the message has been changed.
Impersonation attacks are where an attacker impersonates another ECU and sends messages as if they were that ECU. These attacks are especially concerning because they can
allow an attacker to effectively control a vehicle. The CAN protocol has no built in mechanism for identifying the original sender of any message. An attacker for example could
send messages to engage the brakes and the brakes would activate as if the associated
ECUs had received legitimate commands. Our proposed framework also provides some
protection against these sorts of attacks. The first step of being able to forge messages is to
understand the actual message format. Doing so requires an attacker to reverse engineer the
message protocol by monitoring the network. If the actual message format is not already
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known by an attacker, then it will be difficult for them to reverse engineer it since the data
itself will be encrypted within our framework.
In the event an attacker does know the message format, it will still be difficult for them
to create erroneous messages to produce specific outcomes like applying the brakes. All
messages are encrypted with a session key so an attacker would need to have a copy of that
key in order to properly encrypt their message. Otherwise, their message will get mangled
when the receiving node attempts to decrypt it. This should force the attacker to resort
to a replay attack in which they capture a message and then repeat it to produce a known
result. This is much more time consuming since the attacker would have to try to monitor
the entire network traffic and somehow correlate a specific message payload to a specific
ID with producing a desired response in the vehicle. Since the session key is randomly
generated each time, the encrypted form of a given message will change each time the
session key changes. The attacker would then have to repeat the entire process every time
a new session begins. This prevents an attacker from simply building a library of messages
across several sessions since the messages will change each time.
The types of security threats that our framework does not offer much protection against
are those that do not require reading and/or writing specific data values. Attacks of this
nature succeed by merely transmitting a message regardless of its actual content. One
notable example of this type of attack is a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. A DoS attack
would seek to disable a vehicle by flooding the CAN bus with high priority messages. The
higher priority means that these erroneous messages will get delivered before the valid,
yet lower priority messages required for normal operation. The valid messages never get
delivered and the vehicle is thus unable to function. Certain forms of data tampering and
impersonation attacks would also fall under this type of attack. The goal of these attacks
would not be producing a specific outcome such as controlling the vehicle’s movement.
Instead, they would seek to cause general havoc by either repeating previously seen packets
or sending what would amount to junk data to ECUs. The attacker would have no notion of
what the outcome will be. It would instead be completely up to chance in terms of how the
vehicle will actually respond. As such, the possible response could range in severity from
effectively ignoring the attacker’s messages, all of the way to actually causing some sort of
accident.

6.5.2

Cryptographic Algorithms

The performance of current cryptographic standards is not always suitable for use in resource constrained environments. Lightweight cryptography (LWC) seeks to address this
by specifically designing cryptographic algorithms for resource constrained environments
[162]. Although the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is currently in
the process of setting LWC standards, the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) has published LWC standards.
Our adherence to lightweight cryptographic algorithms [68] [69] should provide other
performance benefits and potentially reduce the cost of implementation. The amount of
computation required to perform basic cryptographic operations such as encryption, key
generation, etc., is reduced in our proposed framework compared to existing solutions
which utilize larger algorithms such as AES. This has the added benefit of potentially
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simplifying any dedicated hardware that is solely designed to perform those operations.
Furthermore, our design does not require any form of secure nonvolatile memory for key
storage as the use of a PUF allows all keys to be generated as needed.
ECDH based on FourQ
For key exchange we used Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) based on FourQ. FourQ
is an elliptic curve which targets the 128-bit security level [35]. Although other curves
targeting the 128-bit security level would also work, FourQ has been shown to be faster
than other popular 128-bit security elliptic curves such as NIST P-256 and Curve25519 in
both key generation and secret exchange [35] [4].
Encryption and Decryption
The use of a block cipher which has a block size of 64 bits means that during regular
communication, the number of CAN frames that must be used to send encrypted data will
remain the same as the number that must be used to send normal unencrypted data. Any
additional overhead introduced by the proposed framework during normal operation would
thus be solely limited to the encryption and decryption operations performed by each node.
Hash Function
It was important to choose a hash function that produced 128-bit hashes as it would allow
us to use hashes as encryption keys. The other major benefit is hashed responses can be
sent in just 2 CAN frames.

6.5.3

Server Capabilities

It is assumed that the server will be secure and have the capability to securely generate
a random session key for each session. It should not be possible to add, remove, and/or
modify nodes and the public keys and hashed responses associated with them except during the enrollment phase in a trusted environment. The server also has the potential to act
as a monitor of sorts during the authentication phase. It could phase certain anomalies as
malicious and either lock out the rest of the authentication phase, or notify a more centralized security system so that it may act accordingly. The CAN protocol does not show the
origin of messages being transmitted. However, it can still detect situations such as multiple authentication attempts for a single node, an incorrect number of nodes attempting to
authenticate, or false messages being transmitted before authentication has ended.

6.6

Comparison to Existing Designs

The security holes present in the CAN protocol have led to led researchers to propose a
variety of different possible solutions. These approaches tend to involve adding security
features through either changes to the base CAN protocol itself [51] [135] [1] or proposing
frameworks around the existing protocol (such the one we are proposing) so that the CAN
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protocol itself remains the same [182] [82] [147]. To the best of our knowledge, there are
not many proposed security solutions that explicitly integrate PUFs as a core component
of the system. As such we are not considering systems in which a PUF could replace an
existing component such as using a PUF to remove the need for secure nonvolatile memory
[45].
One example PUF-based solution is the work from [1]. That work uses PUFs embedded in each ECU to validate the ECU before sending a message to another ECU. All
communication between ECUs is routed through a reference monitor which is responsible
for validating the identity of the ECU during each communication before forwarding the
associated message to its intended recipient. We are not considering this work in our comparisons due to the fact that the CAN bus has been effectively replaced by the reference
monitor.
A separate work also uses a PUF and server based approach in which the server and
each ECU have an integrated PUF [147]. During authentication, the server and each ECU
generate ECDH key pairs from responses generated by each PUF. Every ECU generates a
ECDH key exchange shared secret with the server and transmits an encrypted copy of its
public key. AES-128 is used for encryption the keys. The public key is transmitted across
two CAN frames since AES requires block sizes of 128 bits and the data field in a single
CAN frame is only 64 bits. The server compares the received public keys with the public
keys that it stored during an enrollment phase to validate each ECU. The server then sends
encrypted copies of each valid public key (2 frames each) to each valid ECU along with
a third frame denoting which ECU is associated with that public key. The ECUs use the
received public keys to generate a shared secrets with every other valid node. The ECUs
can then encrypt data being sent to any ECU with a unique key that is only available to the
sending and receiving ECUs. Like before, two CAN frames must be sent for every data
transmission to comply with the block size of AES-128.
There are certain scalability, functionality, and security concerns present in the existing
framework that our proposed solution is able to overcome. The scalability issue lies with
the authentication phase. Each valid ECU must receive encrypted copies of the public
keys for all other valid nodes. For a system with n ECUs, a single ECU will transmit its
public key to the server and receive an encrypted copy of each valid public key along with
a message indicating the node ID associated with each key. This means the server must
overall transmit n2 public keys and therefore the number of public keys that must be sent
will scale quadratically as the number of ECUs increases. If you consider that each public
key sent by an ECU requires 2 CAN frames and each public key transmitted by the server
requires 3 frames, then the total number of frames required for authentication is 3n2 + 2n.
In addition, the fact that there is a unique shared secret between every pair of ECUs prevents
broadcast messages. An ECU must separately encrypt and send duplicate messages to each
intended ECU.
As stated in the previous section, our proposed framework will complete authentication
after sending 4n frames for a system containing n ECUs. This means the number of required frames scales linearly with the number of ECUs in the system. The fact that there is
a single session key shared by all of the nodes mean that our proposed framework supports
messages having multiple intended recipients. The use of PRESENT for encryption allows
an entire encrypted message to fit within the data field of a single CAN frame during nor93

Table 6.1: Required CAN Frames for n ECU System
Operation Phase
Authentication
Normal Communication

[147]

Proposed

3n2 + 2n

4n

2

1

mal communication between ECUs. Table 6.1 shows a comparison between [147] and our
proposed framework in terms of the total number of CAN frames that must be sent during
the different phases of operation within a system containing n ECUs. The table shows
that our approach scales much better for larger systems. For example, a system with 20
ECUs would require the transmission of 1240 frames under the existing framework while
our proposed framework would only require 80.
This scaling issue becomes even more important when you consider the amount of
time it actually takes to transmit a CAN frame. CAN has both high-speed and low-speed
versions. High-speed CAN can transmit data at speeds of up to 1 Mb/s while low-speed
can transmit at speeds of up to 125 kb/s. Standard CAN frames are 108 bits long. There
is also an extended version which is 128 bits. Furthermore, CAN requires at least 3 bits
of spacing between messages. This effectively means that standard and extended frames
require the transmission of 111 bits and 131 bits, respectively. Therefore, Low-Speed CAN
can transmit a standard and extended frames in 896 µs and 1048 µs, respectively. HighSpeed CAN can transmit the frames in 112 µs and 131 µs, respectively.
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show how long the Authentication would take as the number of
nodes increases. Figure 6.8 assumes the system is using standard CAN frames and Figure
6.9 assumes extended CAN frames. For a system with 20 ECUs, our proposed framework
will complete authentication in only 6.5% of the time that it would take the existing framework. That percentage will continue to decrease as the number of ECUs increases. Table
6.2 contains a comparison of the time required to transmit all of the CAN frames required
to complete Authentication with in systems of various sizes. It is important to highlight the
amount of time required for Authentication since it represents extra overhead that is not already present within vehicles. Implementing these frameworks would require introducing
a period of time that the vehicle is unresponsive immediately after it starts. This period of
time might be negligible for systems with a very small number of ECUs, but it will become
increasingly pronounced as the number of ECUs increases. Most importantly, the superior scaling of our proposed framework guarantees that this dead period of operation will
remain nearly imperceptible for much larger systems compared to the existing approach.
NIST guidelines state that for symmetric keys of size 128 bits, the elliptic curve key
size to provide equivalent security is 256 bits [14]. Per the NIST specifications, security
for the 128-bit ECDH key used in [147] would actually be equivalent to a symmetric key
that is less than 80 bits. The normal security strength of AES-128 is potentially undercut
since the shared secret used as the encryption key is derived from the 128-bit ECDH keys.
This could present a vulnerability that could be exploited by an attacker. In our approach,
the encryption key used during normal operation is a session key that the server randomly
generates each time. During enrollment, we are able to make use of 256-bit ECDH FourQ
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Table 6.2: Time Required to Transmit the Frames Required for Authentiction
Speed, Frame

Framework

High, Standard

[147]
Proposed

High, Extended
Low, Standard
Low, Extended

[147]

Number of ECUs
5

10

15

20

25

9.52 ms

35.84 ms

78.96 ms

138.88 ms

215.6 ms

2.24 ms

4.48 ms

6.72 ms

8.96 ms

11.2 ms

11.134 ms

41.92 ms

92.36 ms

162.44 ms

252.18 ms

Proposed

2.62 ms

5.24 ms

7.86 ms

10.48 ms

13.1 ms

[147]

76.16 ms

286.72 ms

631.68 ms

1,111.04 ms

1,724.8 ms

Proposed

17.92 ms

35.84 ms

53.76 ms

71.68 ms

89.6 ms

[147]

89.08 ms

335.36 ms

738.84 ms

1,299.52 ms

2,017.4 ms

Proposed

20.96 ms

41.92 ms

62.88 ms

83.84 ms

104.8 ms

Time Required for Authentication
(Standard Frames)
Existing [155], High-speed CAN
Proposed, High-speed CAN
Existing [155], Low-speed CAN
Proposed, Low-speed CAN
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Figure 6.8: Authentication Phase Overhead Comparison (Standard Frames)
shared secrets by hashing them to 80-bit or 128-bit keys. In this way, the security of the
encryption function is not reduced by the key generation.

6.7

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

In this chapter we present a novel CAN security framework based on PUF. The proposed
framework offers improvements over previous PUF-based frameworks in terms of both
scalability and the message overhead associated with normal operation. The savings in
overhead results in our proposed framework being able to send the number of CAN frames
required for the Authentication of a system with 20 nodes in only 6.5% of the time that it
takes the existing framework. Normal message passing in our proposed framework requires
only a single CAN frame to be sent while the existing approach requires two frames per
message.
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Time Required for Authentication
(Extended Frames)
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Figure 6.9: Authentication Phase Overhead Comparison (Extended Frames)
Our framework merely uses PRESENT and PHOTON as examples of LWC functions.
PRESENT could be substituted for an alternative with a block size of 64-bits and a key
size of at most 128-bits. PHOTON could be replaced by a different lightweight hash that
is capable of producing a 128-bit output. Ongoing efforts in the development of LWCs,
including NIST’s efforts to standardize LWC, will likely result in new functions that offer better performance than what is currently available. Depending on the implementation
focus, it might be preferable to choose an LWC that was optimized for hardware implementation rather than software implementation or vice-versa. One interesting avenue for
future research would be a comprehensive study on the performance of various LWCs when
implemented in both software for various resource-constrained platforms and in hardware
such as FPGAs and ASICs.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Introducing security into IoT and vehicles is a difficult task without a clear and simple
solution. In this work we have highlighted some of the proposed hardware methods for
implementing security including the creation of hardware security modules and various applications for physically unclonable functions (PUFs). These applications involve methods
for key storage, key generation, and message authentication. The focus of our research
efforts has been to create PUFs specifically for cyber-physical systems such as IoT devices
and vehicles. Our approach is to create PUFs from components that are commonly found
in cyber-physical systems. Based on the observed reliability and uniformity values for the
proposed PUF designs with respect to environmental conditions such as temperature, and
in addition to the results of the uniqueness testing, this dissertation concludes that building
PUFs within a cyber-physical system is a new direction worth exploring. This approach
has the potential of being able to add security features to a device without needing to add
any of the additional hardware that would normally be required to implement other security solutions. Similarly, this approach should help reduce the redesign costs that would
be associated with adding security features to existing systems with known vulnerabilities.
A singular PUF design would itself not be sufficient to make this approach a truly viable
security approach for cyber-physical systems. The devices within these systems tend to
have very limited and narrow roles. In order to carry out their required tasks, they would
only require a similarly limited range of sensors and energy harvestors. Consider this information along with the fact that cyber-physical systems are used in a diverse range of
fields including including medical devices, smart homes and cities, environmental monitoring, and industrial processes [27]. These facts make it unlikely that any singular sensor
or energy harvester would be found consistently within cyber-physical systems across all
of these fields. Thus, a PUF design based on a given component would be an option for
a limited range of cyber-physical systems. It is for this reason that we proposed a number
of designs based on different components which are all commonly found in cyber-physical
systems.
The following contribution have been proposed in this work:
• Novel physically unclonable function (PUF) response balancing algorithm.
• Novel piezo sensor based PUF circuit design methodology.
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• Novel thermistor temperature sensor based PUF circuit design methodology.
• Novel solar cell based PUF circuit design methodology.
• Evaluation of solar cell materials for the creation of novel PUF circuits.
• Novel PUF-Based Controller Area Network (CAN) security framework.
This work presents designs of physically unclonable functions (PUFs) which are specifically designed for use in cyber-physical systems. The majority of the contributions have
already been reviewed by the scientific community and subsequently published in journals.
The piezo PUF has also been a hardware demonstration at a conference. A provisional
patent has been granted for the design methodology. The CAN security framework has
been accepted for journal publication [97] and as a conference demonstration. From these
developments we can conclude that there is merit behind our proposed methods of providing security to cyber-physical systems.

7.1

Future Work

The security of cyber-physical systems will continue to be a growing concern which will
in term attract greater interest from researchers. The contributions of this work help to
establish the viability of using PUFs created from sensors and energy harvesting devices
as a security solution in cyber-physical systems. This dissertation has covered a number
of important research topics, however, other areas still remain that require the attention of
future research topics. The following items represent potential areas of future work that
directly build upon those proposed in this dissertation:
• Evaluate the designs on a large population of physical devices. Our evaluations
were performed on a limited number of prototypes or on simulated copies. A larger
test population will provide a more accurate reference for what performance metrics
could be expected of actual production copies of a design.
• Explore methods to allow energy harvesters to still function as a source of energy
when the PUF is not in use. This would allow energy harvesters to truly be both a
source of both power generation and security. Doing so should ease integration by
reducing the need to add additional energy harvesters whose function would be to
generate PUF responses.
• Explore methods for converting the design into a strong PUF. Strong PUFs have
more potential applications than weak PUFs. However they are also known to be
vulnerable to machine learning attacks [145] [173]. The computational component
of the proposed designs could be leveraged to help safeguard against these attacks
• Investigate additional types of solar cell materials for their suitability in creating a
PUF. Testing other solar cell materials would allow for the creation of a comprehensive catalog that could be used to determine if a solar cell based PUF is an appropriate
security option for any solar powered system.
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• Explore methods to improve the reliability of the proposed PUF designs. PUFs
whose reliability value is less than 100% could produce erroneous responses. This is
not ideal for security applications. Researchers have proposed error correcting codes
(ECCs) and other schemes [33] [175] that could be used to improve the reliability
values of the proposed designs.
• Explore methods to increase the tamper resistance of the proposed PUF designs [64]
[103]. This characteristic was not a concern when creating the prototypes to test the
validity of the proposed designs, but it would likely be one in a production quality
implementation.
• Establish some computational performance benchmarks for the CAN security framework. This should include a selection of cryptosystems along with a selection of
hardware implementations.
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